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We investigate the determinants of students’ university choice in Pa-
kistan, with a focus on monetary returns, nonpecuniary factors en-
joyed at school, and financial constraints. Tomitigate the identification
problem concerning the separation of preferences, expectations, and
market constraints, we use rich data on subjective expectations, with di-
rect measures of financial constraints, to estimate a life-cycle model of
school choice jointly with school-specific expectations of dropping
out. We find that labor market prospects play a small role. Instead,
nonpecuniaryoutcomes, suchas the school’s ideology, are themajorde-
terminants. Policy simulations suggest that relaxing financial constraints
would have large welfare gains.
I. Introduction
Higher education participation has expanded considerably worldwide
in the last 50 years, moving in the direction of amass system of education.
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Simultaneously, higher education systems are undergoing changes, such
as the growth of for-profit universities in the United States, the emergence
of a vibrant private sector inmany developing countries, and the creation
of universities by religious organizations in Latin America and Asia (Task
Force on Higher Education and Society 2000). High school graduates,
therefore, have a very wide range of options of higher education institu-
tions available to them, which differ in terms of quality, cost, and other im-
portant characteristics. In this paper, we estimate a life-cycle utility model
of university choice to investigate the determinants of the choice of higher
educational institutions.
We focus on the role of expected monetary returns, nonpecuniary fac-
tors enjoyed at school, and financial constraints in university choice, con-
ditional on participation in higher education. Understanding the relative
role of preferences, expectations (or information sets), andmarket struc-
tures is challenging with the type of data on school attendance and family
backgroundtypicallyavailable(e.g.,Cunha,Heckman,andNavarro2005).
The reason for this challenge is a threefold identification issue. First, ex-
pectations about future earnings are usually not observed. Second, stu-
dents’expectationsaboutnonpecuniaryoutcomesenjoyedwhileat school
are similarly usually not observed. Making inference on the decision-
making process based on choice data andmaintained assumptions on ex-
pectations is problematic since observed choices might be consistent with
several combinations of expectations and preferences (e.g., Savage 1954;
Manski 1993). Finally, data typically available do not provide a direct way
of identifying which students are credit constrained (e.g., Lochner and
Monge-Naranjo 2012).
In this paper, to circumvent these identification issues, we use new data
on (i) subjective expectations about labor market outcomes, (ii) subjec-
tive expectations about nonpecuniary factors (namely, alignment of the
school’s teachings with one’s own ideology, parental approval, and grad-
uation rank), (iii) subjective expectations of dropping out, (iv) choice
sets reflecting which schools are in each student’s budget constraint, and
(v) stated school choice with and without financial constraints. We esti-
mate a life-cycle utility model of university choice without having to make
strongassumptionsonexpectationsabout labormarketoutcomesandnon-
pecuniary factors, or about which students are financially constrained. By
combining data on stated choices and expectations held at the time of
the choices, we can separate expectations from preferences.
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For this purpose, we survey male students of college-going age who are
currently pursuing the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree in different types
of colleges in two urban centers in Pakistan. Students are provided with a
hypothetical scenario of school choice, and asked to rankfive different ex-
isting universities in terms of their preference of enrolling in them (as-
suming guaranteed admissions), conditional on their current financial
status as well as conditional onno school costs. The former is the student’s
constrained stated choice, and the latter the unconstrained stated choice.
This approach of using stated choice allows us to isolate students’ “pure”
preferences—at the time of the survey—free from other confounds, in-
cluding admission, learning, financial constraints, and the role of other
agents in students’ past school choices. The five universities provided in
the choice scenario cover the higher education spectrum in Pakistan,
ranging from expensiveWestern-style elite (private) universities with high
associated labor market returns at one end to free religious institutions
(madrassas) at the other, with public universities somewhere in the mid-
dle.ThePakistanihighereducationsystemthatweconsider isdiverse,mak-
ing it useful to analyze school choice. Our setting is relevant beyond Paki-
stan because of the similarity of Pakistan’s education system to the rest of
South Asia, home to nearly a quarter of the world’s population.
Our survey also collected data from students on their beliefs about var-
ious outcomes (suchas graduation rank, parents’ approval, and labormar-
ket outcomes) if they were to enroll in each of those five schools. We find
considerable variation in students’ beliefs for the outcomes considered
across the different schools, as well as significant heterogeneity in beliefs
across individuals within each school. The subjective belief data, however,
paint a sensible picture. For example, students from all schools believe on
averagethatage30earningsconditionalonworkingandgraduatingfroma
Western-style university are substantially higher than those conditional on
graduating from a madrassa, which is consistent with patterns in actual
earnings data. The data also suggest that students tend to sort into institu-
tions along the nonpecuniary outcomes; for example, beliefs regarding
parents’ approval and graduation rank are, on average, highest for the
school the students are currently enrolled in. Likewise, average beliefs
for dropout tend to be the lowest for the student’s current school.
We use the stated constrained choice—that is, the stated choice under
the respondent’s current financial situation—and the expectations data
to estimate the preference parameters for (log) consumption and for the
nonpecuniary factors. Importantly, wemodel how the expectation of drop-
out depends on the same structural parameters as the ones relevant to
university choice, and use both the stated choice and the subjective prob-
ability of dropout as outcomes to identify and estimate the model using a
generalized method of moments (GMM) procedure.
The estimates of the structural parameters indicate that while expected
earnings are a statistically significant determinant of the type of university
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chosen, they play a rather small role in the choice: the elasticity of school
choice with regard to earnings is about 0.12, comparable to similarly low
schooling choice elasticities found in developed countries (Arcidiacono
2004; Beffy, Fougere, and Maurel 2012; Wiswall and Zafar 2015). On
the other hand, nonpecuniary school-specific factors play a major role in
the choice: wefind that bothparents’ approval of the choice and the align-
ment of the school’s teachings with one’s own ideology are very important
drivers of the choice. For example, students are willing to give up about
a quarter of age 30 consumption to improve the likelihood of these out-
comes by 2 percentage points.
We take advantage of the richness of the data to assess the validity of
our structural model. We use the choice model preference parameters
(estimated using students’ constrained stated choice) to predict students’
choices if school costs were set to zero. We then compare those predic-
tions to students’ stated unconstrained choices that, asmentioned above,
were also elicited in the same survey. This is similar in spirit to assessing
the robustness of a structural model using out-of-sample validation (e.g.,
Todd and Wolpin 2006; Galiani, Murphy, and Pantano 2015). The distri-
bution of enrollment generated by the model matches the stated choice
distribution under no school costs very well. This strengthens the credibil-
ity of the data quality and themodeling assumptions, and gives us greater
confidence in using the model to simulate alternative policies.
Next we use our estimated parameters to simulate the impact of several
sets of policies on students’welfare and enrollment. The existing literature
provides empirical evidence that expectations are history and context de-
pendent.1 So when conducting policy simulations, we allow the expecta-
tions about dropout and about parental approval that we have explicitly
modeled to vary with the policy considered. We only age-adjust the other
expectations as we argue that they are unlikely to be affected by the poli-
cies in the short run. We find that relaxing financial constraints by provid-
ing students with either loans or free schooling (financed by a tax on earn-
ings during students’ later working lives) would increase students’welfare
substantially. Sixty percent of the students in our sample would be better
off and almost 20 percent would enroll in a different school if loans to fi-
nance school costs were available. Our conclusions are largely unchanged
if we take admission constraints into account. This suggests that financial
1 For example, individuals who experienced a recession when young believe that success
in life depends more on luck than effort (Giuliano and Spilimbergo 2014); lifetime per-
sonal experiences affect inflation expectations (Malmendier and Nagel 2016); those in
sub-Saharan Africa who live in regions prone to frequent drought report larger subjective
probabilities of experiencing food shortages or of having to rely on family members for
financial assistance (Delavande and Kohler 2009); and those affected by recent conflict re-
port lower expectations for their future economic situation (Bozzoli, Tilman, and Muhu-
muza 2011).
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constraints play a significant role in the intensive margin of university
choice in a setting like Pakistan, where well-functioning credit markets
are lacking andborrowingor lending is not possible for schooling.Under-
scoring the important role of nonpecuniary factors and the heterogeneity
in tastes for school-specific ideology, we find that any policy that would
make schools more homogeneous in terms of their teachings would have
limited impact on enrollment but would result in welfare losses for a third
of the students.
Our methodology of using strategically designed survey questions is
clearly appealing since we do not have to worry about other confounds.
The validity of this approachhinges on two implicit assumptions. Thefirst
is that students report their expectations (as at the time of the survey)
truthfully. This is an assumption that is implicitly made when using any
survey data and is not specific to expectations data.Note that our approach
does not require that expectations be accurate or predictive of actual real-
izations (though systematic biases in expectations may have certain impli-
cations for policy). The second assumption is that the stated choices re-
ported in the hypothetical scenarios are reflective of what respondents
would do in actual scenarios. There is growing evidence that the two ap-
proaches of using stated choices or actual choices yield similar prefer-
ence estimates.Mas andPallais (2017)find that the stated approach yields
preference estimates for alternative work arrangements that are similar
to those from revealed choices, and Wiswall and Zafar (2018) find that
preferences for workplace amenities recovered from stated hypothetical
choices arepredictiveof actual subsequent real-world choices.2 Therefore,
it seems that the stated approach yields meaningful responses when the
hypothetical scenarios presented to respondents are realistic and relevant
for them, as is the case for the school choice scenarios that we consider.
Our paper relates to various strands of the literature on educational
choice. It belongs toa long traditionofwork seeking todeterminewhether
expectations about future earnings (or about returns to schooling) influ-
ence college attendance, college major, or occupation choice (e.g., Willis
and Rosen 1979; Berger 1988; Flyer 1997; Arcidiacono 2004; Buchinsky
andLeslie 2010; Beffy et al. 2012). The prior literature has relied on various
2 Using stated choice, rather than actual choice, is becoming common in many fields
and is similar to “conjoint analysis” and “contingent valuation” methods, used in market-
ing, environmental and natural resource economics, and health (Louviere, Hensher, and
Swait 2000). Earlier papers in this literature found that the two approaches produce com-
parable utility parameters (e.g., Ben-Akiva and Morikawa 1990; Hensher and Bradley 1993;
Adamowicz, Louviere, and Williams 1994). In addition, stated choices/intentions have
been shown to relate strongly to actual behavior (see, e.g., Steel and Ovalle [1984] for
job turnover, Delavande andManski [2010] for voting, and Parker and Souleles [forthcom-
ing] for consumption response to tax rebates and stimulus payments). Using strategically
designed survey questions in conjunction with structural models has also been fruitfully
applied to household financial decisions (Ameriks et al. 2015).
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types of assumptions (such as myopic or rational expectations) for the
mapping between realized earnings and expected earnings. However, ex-
isting research from both developed and developing countries has found
that individuals tend to be misinformed about the returns to schooling
(e.g., Betts 1996; Jensen 2010; Wiswall and Zafar 2015).
This has prompted some empirical work on educational choice using
expectations data about future earnings.3 While some work in psychology
suggests that people are more likely to think in terms of frequency rather
than probabilities (e.g., Gigerenzer 1991), subjective probabilities and
expectations have increasingly been asked in surveys in the last 20 years.
The existing evidence suggests that these elicited expectations are mean-
ingful in both developed and developing countries, even in very low lit-
eracy settings; for example, expectations have been shown to vary with ob-
servable characteristics in the same way as actual outcomes, and expected
outcomes have been found to be strongly associated with future outcomes
at the individual level (see Manski [2004] and Delavande [2014] for a re-
view in developed and developing countries, respectively).
More recently, these data have been shown to be useful to make infer-
ences about decision-making in various domains (e.g., Lochner 2007; De-
lavande 2008; Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2014b; Wiswall and Zafar
2015). In existing work, elicited expectations are typically either (i) taken
as given and combined with choice data tomake inference on preferences
parameters or (ii) used as the dependent variable (as an expected choice
instead of an actual choice). We contribute to the expectations literature
by combining both approaches: we explain a (stated) school choice that
depends on various expectations, including one that is about an event the
student has control over (dropout), which is in turn explicitly modeled as
a function of the preference parameters influencing school choice.
Related to our work, Arcidiacono, Hotz, and Kang (2012) and Wiswall
and Zafar (2015) use earnings expectations to estimate a life-cycle model,
focusing on major choice in the United States. Attanasio and Kaufmann
(2014) examine the role of expectations about returns to schooling and
of perceptions of labormarket risks in thedecision to continue further ed-
ucation (that is, the extensive margin) in Mexico. We complement these
papers by (1) directly taking into consideration nonpecuniary outcomes
(such as ideology) and additional sources of uncertainty (e.g., regarding
droppingout and employment), which are then embedded in a structural
3 See, e.g., Giustinelli (2016) and Zafar (2011b). A related line of research, surveyed in
Cunha and Heckman (2007), has been to use panel data on earnings combined with col-
lege choice information, and a framework in which one can identify (i) components of the
life-cycle earnings that are forecastable and acted on at the time of the schooling decision
is made, and (ii) components that are not forecastable. The papers reviewed in Cunha and
Heckman (2007) estimate that for a variety of market structures and preferences, over
50 percent of the ex post variance in returns to college is forecastable.
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model; (2) looking specifically at the role of financial constraints; (3) using
both choices and expectations as outcomes to identify structural prefer-
ence parameters and allowing expectations to be policy variant; (4) con-
ducting an out-of-sample validation of our structural model; and (5) pro-
viding the first evidence for understanding university choice on the
intensive margin in a developing-country setting.
Our paper also relates to a large literature investigating the role of
credit constraints in higher education (see Lochner andMonge-Naranjo
[2012] for a review). As mentioned above, this is a challenging task given
that most standard data sources do not provide a direct way of identifying
which students are credit constrained. The literature has adopted various
approaches to deal with this difficulty.4 Similar in spirit to Stinebrickner
and Stinebrickner (2008), our study design bypasses this identification is-
sue by asking students directly which schools are in their budget con-
straints. This allows us to identify precisely which students are financially
constrained in their school choice. Furthermore, our structuralmodel also
enables us to provide evidence on the importance of credit constraints by
simulating various policies that would relax those constraints. Other stud-
ies in developing countries suggest similarly that credit constraints are
substantial in places like Mexico, Chile, and South Africa (Gurgand, Lo-
renceau, and Mélonio 2011; Kaufmann 2014; Solis 2017).
Finally, our paper also builds on a line of research on the role of non-
pecuniary outcomes or psychic costs on educational choice (e.g., Cunha
et al. 2005; Jacob and Lefgren 2007; D’Haultfoeuille and Maurel 2013;
Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner 2014a; Abbott et al. 2016; Navarro and
Zhou 2016; Jacob, McCall, and Stange 2018; Wiswall and Zafar 2018).
The literature finds low educational choice elasticities with respect to
earnings (e.g., Beffy et al. 2012; Wiswall and Zafar 2015), suggesting that
nonpecuniary factors are important. In fact, Eisenhauer, Heckman, and
Mosso (2015) argue that psychic costs play a dominant role in explain-
ing schooling decisions, which constitutes a challenge for the economics
of education. Our approach incorporates certain nonpecuniary factors
directly into the choice model (for example, religious ideology, which is
particularly relevant in the South Asian context) and is able to quantify
their importance in driving educational choices.5 We find that these
4 One approach focuses on looking at the role of income (or wealth) on college atten-
dance (and college quality), after controlling for the student’s ability and other family back-
ground (e.g., Cameron and Heckman 1998; Carneiro and Heckman 2002; Belley and
Lochner 2007; Lovenheim 2011). Another approach uses differential returns to schooling
for constrained and unconstrained students (e.g., Lang 1993; Card 1999; Cameron and
Taber 2004). A third approach estimates structural life-cycle schooling models and evalu-
ates various policies, including relaxing borrowing constraints (e.g., Keane and Wolpin
2001; Cameron and Taber 2004).
5 Zafar (2013), using a similar methodology, finds that enjoying studying the coursework
and gaining approval of parents is instrumental in the choice of majors in the US context.
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nonmonetary factors play a dominant role in school choice in a develop-
ing setting. Given that prior literature has been unable to get into the
black box of psychic factors, the approach used in this paper illustrates
the potential of using such methods to understand the determinants of
human capital choices.
This paper is organized as follows. We provide an overview of the South
Asian and Pakistani education systems in Section II. Section III outlines
a model of school choice. Section IV describes the study design and data
collection methodology. We examine heterogeneity in subjective beliefs
about earnings and other school-specific outcomes and stated school
choice in Section V. Section VI reports estimates from a structural life-
cycle utility model of school choice, while Section VII presents our policy
experiments. Finally, Section VIII concludes.
II. The Higher Education System in South Asia
and Pakistan
The higher education system is organized similarly across South Asia,
with flagship universities at the top of the hierarchy and lower-tier univer-
sities absorbing remaining demand (Barack 2014). The soaring demand
forhigher education has led to the growth of private universities since the
mid-1980s (notably in India, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, and Pakistan), ac-
companied with a shift of the costs of tuition away from the state and onto
students, and uneven quality of education.
In Pakistan, this transition is already well under way: dependence on
public funding is limitedanduniversities are increasingly funded through
fees and commercial ventures. Forty-five percent of the 138 Pakistani uni-
versities are private.6 In addition to the recognized private institutions, a
large number of illegal private universities operate throughout the coun-
try. Both public and private universities have their own entrance exams
that are based on the SAT. Colleges may also base admission decisions on
the Intermediate/Higher Secondary School Examination and/or a per-
sonal interview. Access to higher education is still limited, though: in 2011,
the enrollment rate for students between ages 17 and 23 was 5.1 percent
(Higher Education Commission Pakistan 2012).
Another feature across SouthAsia is the possibility to acquire higher ed-
ucation outside the conventional university system, in madrassas (Islamic
religious schools). The madrassas in Muslim South Asia teach a curricu-
lum known asDars-i-Nizami, which runs from 7 to 9 years after the comple-
tion of the elementary level and covers subjects such as (Arabic) grammar,
rhetoric, Islamic history, and mathematics. This certification is recognized
6 This rate is between that of Bangladesh and Afghanistan (both at 62 percent) and In-
dia (33 percent) (Barack 2014).
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to be equivalent to a bachelor’s ormaster’s degree by the PakistaniMinistry
of Education. A key feature of madrassas is that they are generally free; usu-
ally they do not have any entrance exams either. Estimating madrassas’
enrollment in Pakistan, where 97 percent of the population is Muslim,
is challenging because fewer than a third are registered (Rashid 2000).
However, Ahmad (2004) estimates that there are about 6,000 (secondary
and higher level) madrassas, educating about 600,000 students.
Our study focuses on three types of institutions that represent distinct
parts of the higher education spectrum in Pakistan. At one end, we have
Western-style universities that are similar to American colleges. They pro-
vide a liberal arts curriculum, classes are taught in English, and they have
mixed-gender campuses. These private institutions charge high tuition
and fees andcaterprimarily towealthy students. Islamicuniversities,which
are somewhere in the middle of the spectrum, provide a liberal arts cur-
riculum combined with Islamic teachings and courses. These universities
have segregated campuses for males and females and classes are taught in
Arabic or English. These institutions tend to be public and, therefore, are
accessible to low and middle income groups. Finally, at the other end of
the spectrum are madrassas, which are generally free and are believed
to offer a viable alternative for families that are unable to afford expensive
schools (Singer 2001). Madrassas usually do not impart any vocational
training, andmost of their graduates go on to work in the religious sector.
While returns to schooling are high in a developing-country context
such as Pakistan ( Jaffry, Ghulam, and Shah 2007), the returns do differ
by the type of school, with lower returns associated with public schooling
(relative to private) and with Islamic education (Berman and Stepanyan
2004; Asadullah 2009).7
III. Model
This section develops a simple model of school choice. A student i lives
for T 1 1 periods. Prior to period t 5 0, student i chooses a school s
where he enrolls. In period t 5 0, he enrolls in school s to acquire edu-
cation. Within period t 5 0, he can decide to drop out from school s or
graduate from school s. In period t 5 1, he enters the labor market
where he stays till period t 5 1, ...,T. In our setup, the student’s most
important decisions are (i) the choice of school and (ii) whether to drop
out once enrolled in a school. These are important not only because they
affect the stream of future earnings (and thus consumption) but also be-
cause of the following three individual- and school-specific factors that
the student values when in school: a1is, whether the school’s teachings
7 Data from the late 1970s, however, show that unemployment was typically low after
graduating from a madrassa (Ahmad 2004).
university choice 2351
are consistent with i ’s ideology; a2is , whether his parents approve of the
school; and a3is, i ’s graduation rank at the time of graduation from the
school. These school-specific nonpecuniary factors are only enjoyed by
the student if he does not drop out from the school. In addition, student
i incurs a moving cost d if the school he enrolls in is located in a town dif-
ferent from the one he currently resides in, which is indicated by lis. This
moving cost is incurred as soon as he enrolls in school s, irrespective of
whether he drops out. We further assume that student i has a psychic cost
Wi from dropping out of a school.
Our main interest is to understand student i’s school choice prior to
time t 5 0. We start by defining U gis , the utility of graduating from school
s once enrolled, andU dis , the utility of dropping out from school s once en-
rolled. For tractability, we assume that the utility functions are additively
separable, linear in the school outcomes and location, and logarithmic
in consumption. They are given by
U dis 5 vo
T
t50










j 1 dlis 1 hs 1 gs, (2)
where v is the utility value of log consumption, b is the time preference
discount factor, c jit is i’s consumption at time t (for j 5 fg , dg, where g de-
notes graduate and d dropout), aj is the utility value of outcome a
j
is, and
gs and hs are school-specific constants. The hs’s reflect unobservable school-
specific factors that are enjoyed when in school, and the gs’s capture choice-
specific unobservable factors that affect lifetime utility regardless of the
dropout decision.
Consistent with the lack of well-functioning credit markets in Pakistan,
there is no borrowing or lending possible, so student i will consume his
earnings at every period from t 5 1 to T. Let y jit , for j 5 fd, gg, denote
his period t earnings. At time t 5 0, i needs to finance his schooling out
of his parent’s allowance yi0 and he faces expected school-specific fees Fis
that need to be paid up-front if he enrolls in school s. If he drops out,
his fees will be reimbursed within period t 5 0.




i0 1 Fis ≤ yi0,
chit 5 y
h
it for t 5 1 to T , h 5 g , tf g:
(3)
A key feature of the model is that at the time of choosing school s, the
student faces uncertainty about the school-specific factors as well as
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lifetime earnings associated with each choice. For example, i may be
unsure about the type of teaching taking place in a school, his ability
compared to other students, and his future labor market earnings if he
were to graduate or drop out from a particular school. Student i further
expects to receive new information shocks fyjisgj5fd,gg with mean myi once
he is enrolled that will inform his dropout decision. These information
shocks are individual-, school-, and dropout decision–specific and are as-
sumed by the students to be additive to the utility functions given in equa-
tions (1) and (2). They are not realized at the time of choosing a school s
prior to time t 5 0, but will be realized at t 5 0 by the time the student de-
cides whether to drop out. Based on the information available to him prior
to time t 5 0, student i possesses a distribution of beliefs Gis of all these
events, conditional on each school s. Using the law of iterated expectations,
we now define student i’s subjective expected lifetime utility associated with
choosing school s prior to time t 5 0 as follows:
Ei Uisð Þ 5 Pis dð ÞE U dis 1 ydisð Þ 1 1 2 Pis dð Þ½ E U gis 1 ygisð Þ 1 εis
5 Pis dð Þ
ð
U dis 1 y
d
isð ÞdGis






isð ÞdGis 1 εis ,
(4)
where εis is a random termwhich is individual- and school-specific, observ-
able to student i at the time of choosing school s but not to the econome-
trician. Because of the separability assumption of the utility, only mar-
ginal beliefs matter in writing the subjective expected utility. We denote
by Pis(aj) the marginal probability about the binary factors a
j
is for j 5
f1, 2g, and by Eis(a 3) i ’s expected graduation rank if he enrolls in school
s. Regarding future earnings, besides the uncertainty about graduating
from school s, the student is uncertain about whether he would find a
job, and about what his earnings would be for each of these scenarios. Stu-
dent i therefore possesses the following school-specific subjective proba-
bilities: the probability Pisð jobjdÞ of finding a job if he drops out after en-
rolling in school s and the probability Pisð jobjg Þ of finding a job if he
graduates from school s after enrolling in school s. He also possesses sub-
jective expectations Yisjt about his labor earnings at time t if he enrolls in
school s and either drops out (j 5 d) or graduates (j 5 g).8 In case of un-
employment, earnings are assumed to be a fraction r of the earnings if
8 For ease of exposition, we initially assume that there is no uncertainty in earnings con-
ditional on employment. We relax this assumption later in the empirical analysis. Note that
the specification assumes that students cannot transfer between schools, and that students
enter the labor market after either graduating or dropping out of school.
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employed. We assume for simplicity that Pisð jobjdÞ and Pisð jobjg Þ are time
invariant.
Student i’s subjective expected lifetime utility of attending school s given
in equation (4) can then be written as




jð Þ 1 a3Eis a3ð Þ 1 hs
" #




bt Pis dð Þ Pis jobjdð Þ ln Yisdtð Þ1 12 Pis jobjdð Þ½  ln rYisdtð Þf gð
1 1 2 Pis dð Þ½  Pis jobjgð Þ ln Yisgt
 
1 1 2 Pis jobjgð Þ½  ln rYisgt
  Þ
1 Pis dð ÞWi 1 dlis 1 gs 1 myi 1 εis:
(5)
At the time of choosing which school to enroll in (i.e., prior to time
t 5 0), student i also formulates the subjective probability Pis(d) of drop-
ping out from s. It is the probability that his subjective expected utility of
dropping out is strictly larger than his subjective expected utility of grad-
uating. The information shocks fyjisgj5fd,gg are not realized at the time of
formulating the subjective probability of dropping out but will be at the
time of the dropout decision, while the outcomes fajg3j51, fyditgTt51, fygitgTt51
will still not be realized. Let His denote the subjective distribution of be-





prior to time t 5 0. Student i’s subjective probability of dropout if he en-
rolls in school s is therefore given by
Pis dð Þ 5 P
ð























bt ln Yisdtð Þ2 ln Yisgt
 






Because student i cannot borrow to finance the school cost and be-
cause fees need to be paid up-front before the dropout decision, student
i will choose the school s that maximizes his subjective expected utility
(5) among the set of schools for which the period-zero budget constraint
ci0 1 Fis ≤ yi0 is not violated, that is, schools for which the fees do not
(5)
2354 journal of political economy
exceed parents’ allowance. Let Si denote the set of schools that satisfy i ’s
period-zero budget constraint. Student i solves maxs∈SiEiðUisÞ, subject to
the budget constraint (3) and equation (6).
The goal of the empirical analysis is to estimate the parameters of the
utility function (up to scale). For this purpose, it is only necessary to have
information on the expectations agents hold at the time they make their
choice, since those are the beliefs relevant for the decision-making process.
Identification of the empirical choice model is discussed in Section VI.
As mentioned above, we relax the conventional approach of assuming a
mapping between beliefs and realizations of outcomes (such as earnings
and ability) for the school that is chosen as well as the schools that are
not chosen, and instead collect data on students’ subjective expectations
about school-specific outcomes.
Importantly, in our analysis of school and dropout choice, we model
some expectations as a function of the preference parameters (i.e., the
subjective probability of dropout), while others are taken as given by the
respondents (e.g., the subjective probability of a school’s teaching being
consistent with ideology). Whether expectations relate to the structural
preference parameters depends on the nature of the event over which ex-
pectations are formed. Conceptually, we can classify the expectations rel-
evant to our model as follows: (i) expectations over a controlled event or
futurechoice: the individualhas full controlover theevent/choice(forex-
ample, whether to drop out or not); (ii) expectations over uncontrolled
events: the individual has no control over the event and heterogeneity in
expectations depends on individual-specific beliefs regarding the under-
lying processes and information sets (e.g., the school’s ideology, parental
approval); and (iii) expectations over semicontrolled events: the individ-
ual has direct control over some determinants of the event but not others,
andnot over the event itself (e.g., graduation rank, earnings, employment).
Expectations over future choices depend on structural preference parame-
ters (in the same way that actual choices do), while expectations over un-
controlled events do not.9
IV. Study Design
This section describes our sample, data collection methodology, and sur-
vey design.
9 In our analysis, we do not model expectations over semicontrolled events. In reality,
expectations over semicontrolled events such as graduation rank and labor market out-
comes may be partially affected, e.g., by the student’s effort at university or during the
job search. Thus, they might depend on the structural preference parameters as well. Con-
ditional on effort, they are, however, similar to expectations over uncontrolled events. We
abstract from effort decisions in our analysis (implicitly assuming that those decisions are
policy invariant) and focus on school and dropout choices.
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A. The Sample
Our study was conducted in two Western-style universities, one Islamic
university (IU), and four madrassas (M), all located in Islamabad/Rawal-
pindi and Lahore, between May and October 2010.10 The Islamabad/Ra-
walpindi metropolitan area is the third largest in the country with a pop-
ulation of about 4.5 million, and Islamabad is Pakistan’s capital. Lahore
is the capital of the Punjab province and the country’s second largest city
with about 10 million inhabitants.
The institutions in our sample are among the five largest and best-
regarded institutions in the relevant category in each city. Among all the
institutions we contacted, one university and one madrassa declined par-
ticipation. We sampled the higher level students in the four madrassas
since theyare similar inage touniversity students andarepursuing thema-
drassa equivalent of a bachelor’s degree. Though participation was vol-
untary, almost everyone in the madrassas participated in the study. At the
other institutions, a random sample of students was selected to participate
based on a listing of students provided by the registrar’s office. The aver-
age response rate at the universities was about 70 percent. Our analytical
sample consists of 2,149 male students.11
The twoWestern-style universities in our sample differ in their selectiv-
ity, reputation, and cost. We term the more expensive, selective, and rep-
utable university “Very Selective University” (VSU) and the other simply
“Selective University” (SU). Since the four madrassas in our sample are
similar in terms of their student body composition, we pool the data across
the four madrassas (M). We discuss the data collection procedure in ap-
pendix A.
B. Sample Characteristics
Table 1 presents the characteristics of students at the four institution
groups. There is substantial sorting in terms of observables into these in-
stitutions. As we move across the columns from VSU toward M in table 1,
the average socioeconomic characteristics deteriorate. For example, the
monthly parental income of VSU students is nearly twice that of SU stu-
dents, about 4.5 times that of students at IU, and 10 times that of M stu-
dents. Similar patterns emerge with regard to parents’ education and asset
ownership: the proportion of students with at least one college-educated
parent declines from 89 percent for VSU students to about 13 percent
10 We excluded public secular universities from the study, since they tend to be large and
have separate campuses for each of the broad fields of study. Surveying a representative set
of students in such schools would not have been feasible.
11 We interviewed 2,347 male students. For the empirical analysis, we exclude respon-
dents reporting beliefs (school costs and expected earnings) below the 0.5th percentile
and above the 99.5th percentile of the respective distributions. The demographic charac-
teristics of the full sample are similar to those of the analytical sample.
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for M students. The students also differ in the type of high school they
attended, with 75 percent of the VSU students having attended a private
school compared to only 10 percent of the M students.
Students from the various groups also report different levels of self-
reported religiosity. Students were asked to rate how religious they con-
sidered themselves on a scale from 0 (not religious at all) to 10 (very re-
ligious). As one may expect, religiosity increases as we move across the
columns of table 1: The average religiosity is 5.4 for VSU students and
9.2 for M students. There is also variation in the school year of students,
with nearly a third of our sample being in the first year.12
12 Given that madrassas tend to admit students starting at young ages, only a small pro-
portion (1.5 percent) of M students are in the first year in our sample. Throughout the
paper, we classify an M student as being first year if he is 20 years old or younger. We find
that 31.8 percent of M students fall into that group.
TABLE 1
Sample Characteristics
All VSU SU IU M
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Number of respondents 2,149 206 485 429 1,029
Age 21.9 20.6 21.6 21.9 22.2
(2.8) (3.6) (2.3) (2.5) (3.0)
Percentage with at least one college-educated
parent 39.0 89.3 67.0 46.2 12.7
Parents’ monthly income (in thousands
of rupees) 58.0 193.4 95.9 42.4 19.3
(122.4) (231.5) (148.5) (52.9) (54.6)
Percentage with above-median income 45.1 93.2 79.8 53.4 15.6
Percentage whose parents own the following:
Home 84.4 91.7 87.2 81.1 82.9
Television 58.1 91.3 83.9 79.5 30.0
Cell phone 78.2 91.7 80.2 79.5 74.0
Computer 48.1 84.0 70.3 59.9 25.2
Car 36.6 84.0 67.4 41.7 10.2
Religiosity (0–10)a 7.5 5.4 5.9 6.3 9.2
(2.4) (1.6) (1.9) (1.7) (1.6)
Percentage who attended private school
before university 35.9 75.2 68.7 41.7 10.2
Percentage of first-year studentsb 35.7 70.4 29.7 34.7 31.8
Percentage of expenses covered by the
following:
Parents and family 79.6 89.2 83.0 78.0 77.9
(27.5) (26.1) (23.8) (28.6) (28.6)
Loans and aid that must be repaid 6.5 1.3 5.6 6.4 7.3
(14.7) (6.3) (15.4) (15.8) (14.3)
Grants and aid that need not be repaid 5.7 3.7 3.9 8.3 5.6
(13.6) (16.0) (10.3) (17.5) (13.0)
Personal savings and earnings 8.3 5.8 7.5 7.3 9.2
(17.8) (20.9) (14.5) (15.9) (19.6)
Note.—Table reports the mean of the continuous variables, with standard deviations in
parentheses.
a Self-reported religiosity on a scale of zero (not religious at all) to 10 (very religious).
b An M student is classified as being first-year if he is 20 years old or younger.
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Regarding the financing of educational expenses, table 1 shows that the
education expenses are covered largely by parents and family (80 percent,
on average). We also see that M students have a higher reliance on loans/
aid that need to be repaid, and on personal savings/earnings.
V. Description of Expectations and Preferences
This section describes students’ choice set, their stated school choice, and
the subjective expectations data. Appendix A presents the exact wording
of some relevant questions from the survey instrument.
A. Stated Choice and Choice Set Data
For the purposes of understanding school choice, we asked respondents
to consider the following hypothetical situation: “The following question
asks you to consider some hypothetical enrollment choices assuming that
you did not start your degree at your current institution. Suppose that you
were guaranteed admission in the following: the bachelor’s degree pro-
gram at Very Selective University, the bachelor’s degree program at Selec-
tive University, the bachelor’s degree program at Islamic University, the
Alim course at Madrassa–City 1, and the Alim course at Madrassa–City 2.
Suppose further that you were guaranteed admission only at those five
institutions. We ask you to think about where you would choose to go.”
Students were then asked various questions about where they would
choose to enroll.13 First, they were asked to rank the institutions belong-
ing to the constrained choice set according to their preference for enroll-
ing in them. The set of schools that a student can afford to attend finan-
cially (i.e., the constrained choice set Si from Sec. III) is determined as
follows:Studentswereaskedthemaximumeducation-relatedexpenses that
they and their family can cover, and the perceived net costs for each of the
five institutions. Schools for which the perceived net costs were at or below
the reported maximum expenses that the student (and their family) can
pay are thendefined as being in the student’s constrained choice set. Since
the student’s current institution was included in the list of schools, the stu-
dent’s constrained choice set included at least their current school.
Next, students were told to consider a scenario in which all expenses
would be covered: “As before, suppose that you are guaranteed admission
13 In the questionnaire, students saw the actual name of each of the institutions. The
school the student was currently enrolled in was included in the list. Depending on the city
in which the student currently resides, two or three of the five schools were located in the
student’s current city. As mentioned above, the institutions we chose are among the five
largest in their relevant category in their respective city. However, to make sure that stu-
dents were familiar with them, we provided students with a two-sentence description of
each school. City 1 refers to a fixed city that was mentioned to the respondents.
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in each of these five schools, and that you are provided with financial aid
such that all your expenses (tuition, boarding, room, etc.) are paid for at
each institution.” In this scenario, all five schools are part of all students’
choice set. This is the unconstrained choice set. Students were then asked
to rank all five institutions in terms of their preference for enrolling in
them. Note that in both scenarios above, students are told that they are
guaranteed admission into each of the institutions. Therefore, the hypo-
thetical situation abstracts from any concerns related to admissibility.
We describe below the stated choice data. To facilitate the reading of
the tables and description of results, we use the acronyms VSU, SU, IU,
and M when referring to the schools in which students are currently en-
rolled, and we use the full names (Very Selective University, Selective Uni-
versity, Islamic University, and Madrassa City–1 or Madrassa–City 2) when
referring to the hypothetical set of schools that students could enroll in.
1. Constrained Choice
Panel A of table 2 shows the statistics related to the constrained choice
set. Only about 43 percent of the students report being able to afford at-
tending Very Selective University. On the other hand, 94 percent of stu-
dents report being able to cover the costs of attending madrassas. This is
consistent with the actual high costs of attending the universities, and
practically no tuition at madrassas (as also indicated in col. 6 of table 5,
which reports cost). As wemove across the columns, the proportion of stu-
dents who can attend each school type generally decreases; this variation
is quite sensible since table 1 shows that socioeconomic characteristics of
students deteriorate moving from VSU to M.14
Panel A of table 2 also shows the proportion of students who rank each
of the schools as their top choice. We see that Very Selective University is
ranked highest by 84 percent of VSU students, 15 percent of SU students,
9 percent of IU students, and less than 1 percent of M students. This var-
iation is likely a result of either differences in preferences and/or feasi-
bility of the choice. Only 45 percent of SU students say they can afford
Very Selective University. By construction, therefore, at least 55 percent
of SU students could not have ranked Very Selective University the high-
est. In fact, we see that the median number of schools ranked by M stu-
dents is only two (out of five): the median M student reports being able
to afford only the two madrassas (and hence only ranks them). Similarly,
the median IU and SU students rank only four schools, while the median
14 Table A1 in the online appendix further shows that there is sensible variation in the
affordability of the various schools by various demographic characteristics. For example,
58 percent of students from the highest tercile of parents’ income report that Very Selec-
tive University is in their constrained choice set, versus only 27 percent of students from the
lowest tercile.
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VSU student ranks five schools. This indicates that affordability plays an
important role in students’ choices.15
TABLE 2
Ranking of Schools and Credit Constraints
All VSU SU IU M
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. With School Costs
Proportion who can afford the school:
Very Selective University .43 1.00 .45 .41 .30
Selective University .60 .92 1.00 .66 .31
Islamic University .65 .90 .79 1.00 .39
Madrassa–City 1 .94 .97 .96 .96 .91
Madrassa–City 2 .94 .95 .98 .95 .92
x2 test .000 .000 .000 .000 .000
Proportion who rank school the highest:
Very Selective University .13 .84 .15 .09 .003
Selective University .12 .06 .46 .07 .002
Islamic University .20 .05 .21 .70 .01
Madrassa–City 1 .24 .04 .09 .09 .42
Madrassa–City 2 .30 .01 .09 .05 .56
Number of schools ranked:
Mean 3.5 4.6 4.1 3.9 2.8
Median 4 5 4 4 2
Proportion who switch highest-ranked
school from current school .27 .13 .54 .29 .15
B. No School Costs
Proportion who rank school the highest
conditional on no school costs:
Very Selective University .37*** .79 .72*** .59*** .02***
Selective University .04*** .08 .09*** .04* .01***
Islamic University .15*** .06 .10*** .31*** .13***
Madrassa–City 1 .20*** .03 .05* .06* .37*
Madrassa–City 2 .24*** .04* .03*** .01*** .47***
Proportion who switch highest-ranked
school from panel A to panel B .41 .31 .65 .59 .24
Number of students 2,149 206 485 429 1,029
Note.—We conduct a x2 test for the equality of proportions who rank a school highest
conditional on school costs, and the proportion who rank the school highest conditional
on no costs. Significance denoted by asterisks on proportions reported in panel B.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
15 A notable observation in panel A of table 2 is that 27 percent of the students do not
rank their own school as their first choice. One reason for a different choice may be the
fact that some students were unable to gain admission to their preferred school. Other rea-
sons include the possibility that students have learned new information about the various
schools since they made their choice (see Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner [2014a, 2014b]
for the role of learning). Likewise, the switching behavior may arise if parents were instru-
mental in students’ actual choice, which may not be reflected in the hypothetical choice.
We discuss this in Sec. III.
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2. Unconstrained Choice
Panel B of table 2 reports the unconstrained choice of the students. Com-
paring column 1 in panel B to that in panel A, we see that the proportion
of students assigning the highest rank to VSU triples to 37 percent, while
the proportions for the other schools are lower (all these proportions are
significantly different from their corresponding values in panel A at the
1 percent level, using a x2 test).
Two patterns are of note in this panel. First, we see that among SU and
IU students, the proportion who assign the highest rank to Very Selective
University is substantially higher than the proportion who rank their cur-
rent institution the highest. Absent school costs and assuming guaran-
teed admissions, the majority of SU and IU students (72 percent and
59 percent, respectively) would enroll in Very Selective University. Sec-
ond, while the increase in M students who rank Very Selective University
is small (from 0.3 percent to 2 percent), there is a large jump in the pro-
portion of students who now rank Islamic University the highest (13 per-
cent compared to 1 percent in the presence of school costs).
The panel also reports the proportion of students who switch their top-
ranked school with the waiver of costs: we see that 41 percent of the stu-
dents would choose a different school, were it not for school costs. This
suggests that financial constraints may play an important role in school
choice.
B. Expectations about Future Earnings
Studentswereaskedtwosetsofearningsexpectations, conditionaloneach
school. First, respondentswere askedabout their own age30earnings con-
ditional on graduating as well as dropping out from each of the schools
(and conditional on working). Students were also asked about the prob-
ability of being employed conditional on graduating as well as dropping
out from each of those schools. These expectations are the relevant ones
for theirdecision-makingprocess (seeSec. III).Wealso collected students’
beliefs about the average earnings at age 30 of a typical workingmale grad-
uate of each of these institutions. We refer to these as beliefs about popu-
lation earnings. These allow us to investigate whether students are aware
of the differential labor market returns associated with each of the
schools.16 We describe each of these expectations in turn.
16 Such an analysis is not possible for self earnings beliefs since those may differ from ob-
jectivemeasures of earnings of current graduates for several reasons. Respondentsmay, e.g.,
have private information about themselves that justifies having different expectations, or
they may think that future earnings distributions will differ from the current ones.
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1. Expectations about Population Earnings
Table 3 shows themean, median, and standard deviation of respondents’
beliefs about the average earnings of current age 30 graduates from each
of the schools. Each column shows the beliefs held by students from a
given institution. In column 1, which pools students from all institutions,
we see that themean belief about monthly population earnings varies be-
tween Rs. 17,100 for madrassa graduates to Rs. 45,900 for Very Selective
University graduates. Selective University and Islamic University gradu-
ates are believed to have earnings that are somewhere in between.Median
earnings beliefs also follow a similar pattern. There is, however, consider-
able heterogeneity in beliefs as indicated by the large standard deviation
in beliefs about the population means. For example, for Very Selective
University graduates, the overall median earnings are Rs. 40,000, while
the 10th percentile is Rs. 10,000 and the 90th percentile is Rs. 86,000.
The table also reports the response rates: they are above 99 percent, indi-
cating that missing data are not an issue.
Columns 2–5 of the table present the average population beliefs, as
reported by students currently enrolled in the four school types. The lev-
els of earnings reported by students in the four school types differ quite
TABLE 3
Population Beliefs: Perceived Age 30 Monthly Earnings (in Thousands of Rupees)
of Male Graduates of Different School Types
All VSU SU IU M Objective Valuea
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Very Selective University 45.9 43.9 67.9 60.3 29.8 38.8
[40.0] [40.0] [55.0] [50.0] [25.0] [41.3]
(46.0) (29.9) (69.6) (37.3) (28.3) (10.9)
Selective University 36.0 40.4 44.4 42.2 28.6 30.9
[30.0] [35.0] [35.0] [40.0] [20.0] [30.3]
(49.3) (23.3) (75.4) (30.3) (42.4) (11.2)
Islamic University 34.0 34.2 45.8 43.4 24.5 26.0
[30.0] [30.0] [35.0] [40.0] [20.0] [25.0]
(38.8) (18.2) (66.6) (24.3) (23.1) (3.6)
Madrassa–City 1 17.1 29.0 21.6 18.2 12.1 9.4
[15.0] [20.0] [20.0] [17.0] [10.0] [8.8]
(16.9) (21.9) (18.7) (10.6) (15.0) (1.8)
Madrassa–City 2 17.6 28.5 21.6 18.8 13.0 15.0
[15.0] [25.0] [20.0] [18.0] [10.0] [15.0]
(16.1) (19.4) (12.9) (11.8) (16.6) (4.1)
Number of respondents 2,149 206 485 429 1,029
Response rateb 99.4 99.5 100.0 99.5 99.1
Note.—Medians are reported in square brackets and standard deviations in parentheses.
a Objective value refers to the survey responses of the administrators of the institutions
(four administrators each at VSU, SU, M–City 1, and M–City 2, and three administrators
at IU).
b Percentage of responses with no missing data for any variables in the column.
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substantially for each of the five school choices. However, despite differ-
ences in levels, beliefs about relative population earnings for the different
school types are similar for students enrolled in each of the schools, with
students expecting average earnings to be the highest for Very Selective
University graduates and the lowest for madrassa graduates.
Columns 1–5 of table 3 indicate that students expect labor market re-
turns associated with the five schools to differ significantly. A relevant
questionforpolicymakers iswhether theseperceptionsareaccurate.To in-
vestigate that, one would need to know the “true” population earnings.
However, these data do not exist, since none of these schools collect data
on their graduates’ labor market outcomes. In order to shed light on
how well informed students are, we instead conducted a poll of a handful
of administrators at each of these schools and asked them about the aver-
age earnings of their recent graduates.17 These statistics are reported in
column 6 of the table. While these data are based on small sample sizes
and on perceptions of administrators, they are still informative. The me-
dian earnings beliefs of the students (in col. 1) are quite similar to theme-
dians reportedby the school administrators.More importantly, both sources
of data yield a similar ranking of schools based on earnings.
2. Expectations about Own Future Earnings
Panel A of table 4 reports expected age 30 own earnings conditional on
graduation. As in table 3, each column shows the beliefs held by students
from a given institution. Pooling all students in column 1, we see that ex-
pectations about own earnings follow the same pattern as expectations
about population beliefs, with students believing their earnings will be
highest if they graduate from Very Selective University and lowest if they
graduate from a madrassa. A comparison of column 1 with population
beliefs (in col. 1 of table 3) shows that expectations about own and pop-
ulation earnings are very similar. We find a significant correlation of .715
between own andpopulation earnings expectations in our sample (Spear-
man rank; p 5 :000), suggesting that ownearnings expectations arebased
in part on individuals’ beliefs about the population distribution of earn-
ings. This high correlation also suggests that if respondents are misin-
formedabout thedistributionofpopulationearnings, theywillhavebiased
own earnings expectations. The online appendix describes the heteroge-
neity in expectations.
Panel B of table 4 shows respondents’ own earnings expectations at
age 30 conditional on enrolling in each of the schools, but dropping
17 A separate survey was designed for the school administrators. This was filled out by
four administrators each at VSU, SU, M–City 1, and M–City 2, and by three administrators
at IU.
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out without a degree. On average, respondents report significantly lower
earnings (relative to graduating from those schools, as shown in panel A).
It is also notable that with the exception of VSU students, respondents on
average believe they would earn more were they to enroll and drop out
from any of the nonmadrassa schools than if they were to graduate from
a madrassa.
TABLE 4
Age 30 Self Monthly Earnings Beliefs Conditional
on Working (in Thousands of Rupees)
All VSU SU IU M
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
A. Beliefs about Own Age 30 Earnings
Conditional on Graduating
Very Selective University 47.3 52.0 70.1 61.1 29.8
[40.0] [50.0] [60.0] [50.0] [25.0]
(39.6) (30.5) (47.4) (37.6) (28.5)
Selective University 34.0 36.6 43.7 39.6 26.6
[30.0] [30.0] [35.0] [35.0] [20.0]
(25.5) (25.3) (28.0) (21.1) (23.7)
Islamic University 34.3 46.5 41.8 45.2 23.8
[30.0] [40.0] [35.0] [40.0] [20.0]
(26.5) (29.0) (27.8) (28.7) (19.4)
Madrassa–City 1 15.9 21.0 22.0 17.8 11.1
[15.0] [20.0] [20.0] [15.0] [8.5]
(12.5) (13.7) (13.1) (10.7) (10.6)
Madrassa–City 2 17.1 27.8 21.9 18.8 12.0
[15.0] [20.0] [20.0] [18.0] [10.0]
(14.3) (21.5) (13.5) (11.5) (11.4)
Response Ratea 99.6 100.0 100.0 99.5 99.4
B. Beliefs about Own Age 30 Earnings
Conditional on Dropping Out
Very Selective University 24.1 32.8 32.5 28.8 16.4
[20.0] [27.5] [30.0] [25.0] [12.0]
(23.3) (20.8) (25.9) (20.3) (21.0)
Selective University 19.5 29.0 22.8 20.7 15.5
[15.0] [25.0] [20.0] [20.0] [10.0]
(18.3) (17.8) (18.3) (12.8) (19.2)
Islamic University 19.3 23.5 22.9 23.0 15.3
[15.0] [20.0] [20.0] [20.0] [10.0]
(18.7) (16.9) (21.3) (17.5) (17.3)
Madrassa–City 1 11.8 18.7 14.3 11.2 9.5
[10.0] [10.0] [10.0] [10.0] [7.0]
(11.6) (18.3) (11.5) (8.4) (10.2)
Madrassa–City 2 12.5 19.9 13.9 11.6 10.7
[10.0] [15.0] [10.0] [10.0] [8.0]
(12.7) (17.4) (11.2) (10.4) (12.7)
Response ratea 99.4 98.5 100.0 99.3 99.3
Number of respondents 2,149 206 485 429 1,029
Note.—Medians are reported in square brackets and standard deviations in parentheses.
a Percentage of responses with no missing data for any variables in the column.
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Students, in addition, were asked the employment probabilities at age 30
conditional on both dropping out and graduating—beliefs that are rele-
vant for the decision model described in Section III. These beliefs are
shown in table A2 (tables A1–A6 and figs. A1–A5 are available in the
online appendix) and described there.
C. Beliefs about Other School-Specific Factors
Besides data on labor market outcomes, we also collected data on beliefs
of students about other factors that may affect the likelihood of a student
choosing that school. The set of factors that we include is as follows:
(1) dropping out from the school, (2) alignment of the school’s teach-
ings with own ideology, (3) graduation rank, (4) parents’ approval of the
choice, and (5) monthly net expenses (including tuition). Students were
asked for their beliefs about each of these factors, conditional on having
enrolled in each of the five different school choices.18
Table 5 reports the average beliefs for these outcomes. The top part of
the table reports beliefs about the probability of dropping out. We see
that students believe they are on average less likely to drop out from the
school they are currently enrolled in. This is indicative of sorting into in-
stitutions along this dimension. M students, for example, expect to be a
third as likely to drop out from a madrassa as from Very Selective Univer-
sity or Selective University. Table 5 is discussed in further detail in the on-
line appendix.
On the whole, analysis of the subjective expectations indicates that stu-
dents perceive significant differences across the school choices along the
various dimensions.Moreover, there is substantial heterogeneity in beliefs
of students enrolled within a school, as well as across schools. It is this var-
iation that we exploit in our estimation. Before moving to the empirical
analysis, it is worth emphasizing a few benefits of our approach. First, an
advantage of eliciting subjective beliefs is that one can also elicit quantita-
tive beliefs about nonpecuniary outcomes (such as parents’ approval)—
data that otherwise are not available. Second, table 5 highlights the ad-
vantageof eliciting beliefs forbinaryoutcomes(suchasparents’ approval)
as probabilistic expectations since simple binary responses would be un-
able to fully unmask this heterogeneity. Third, and perhaps most impor-
tantly, table A3 shows that beliefs about the nonpecuniary outcomes are
in fact systematically correlated with earnings expectations and perceived
employment likelihood. This underscores the point that ignoring the
18 Graduation rank was elicited on a 1–100 scale, where 1 meant the best rank. To pro-
vide easier interpretation, we rescaled the graduation rank beliefs such that 100 represents
highest rank and 1 represents lowest rank. Other beliefs were elicited as percentages. See
app. A.
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nonpecuniary outcomes and subsuming them in the error term in choice
models could be problematic.19
TABLE 5
Beliefs about Various School-Related Outcomes, across School Choices
All VSU SU IU M
Objective
Valuea
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Probability of dropping out:
Very Selective University 40.7 21.4 23.5 26.8 58.5
Selective University 40.9 43.5 17.0 28.6 56.8
Islamic University 30.8 52.0 23.9 12.2 37.6
Madrassa–City 1 30.2 60.1 33.5 35.9 20.3
Madrassa–City 2 28.4 65.3 32.3 37.1 15.7
Response rate 99.1 97.1 99.8 98.8 99.3
Probability of teachings consistent
with ideology:
Very Selective University 53.0 71.8 69.6 66.8 35.7
Selective University 51.4 59.4 68.2 60.5 38.1
Islamic University 65.2 46.4 66.6 76.9 63.3
Madrassa–City 1 67.7 31.2 53.9 56.9 86.1
Madrassa–City 2 69.0 31.2 54.8 56.5 88.5
Response rate 99.8 100.0 100.0 99.8 99.6
Probability of parents’ approval:
Very Selective University 60.3 79.1 81.5 74.8 40.4
Selective University 58.1 63.5 81.7 66.8 42.2
Islamic University 69.5 52.3 69.5 88.7 64.8
Madrassa–City 1 64.3 27.3 48.6 50.1 85.0
Madrassa–City 2 67.3 33.3 52.4 48.5 88.9
Response rate 99.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.2
Graduation rank:
Very Selective University 68.0 66.0 66.6 70.3 68.0
Selective University 70.2 62.5 75.3 72.5 68.3
Islamic University 76.4 66.0 73.2 81.1 78.1
Madrassa–City 1 74.6 54.1 67.4 67.4 85.1
Madrassa–City 2 74.9 55.9 68.2 67.1 85.2
Response rate 99.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.4
Average monthly net expenses
(in thousands of rupees):
Very Selective University 27.6 42.2 37.2 25.3 20.9 15.5
Selective University 20.8 36.2 21.6 17.2 18.9 18.4
Islamic University 16.9 31.1 21.6 12.6 13.6 9.3
Madrassa–City 1 7.7 17.3 12.9 6.9 3.7 1.6
Madrassa–City 2 7.5 17.0 10.7 7.7 3.9 1.7
Response rate 98.9 98.1 99.8 99.3 98.4
Number of respondents 2,149 206 485 429 1,029
Note.—Table reports the mean statistics.
a Objective value refers to the survey responses of the administrators of the school (four
administrators each at VSU, SU, M–City 1, and M–City 2, and three administrators at IU).
19 Typically such models are estimated under the assumption that the error term is or-
thogonal to the other elements of themodel; this is likely to yield biased estimates. An alter-
native to directly incorporating nonpecuniary outcomes in the model—as we do here—is
differencing out tastes using exogenous changes in choices and expectations, say through
an information experiment (see Wiswall and Zafar 2015).
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VI. Empirical Results
We first discuss identification of the choice model outlined in Section III
and then discuss the estimation results.
A. Identification and Empirical Specifications
1. Parametric Assumptions on the Utility Functions
We estimate the parameters of the utility function described in Section III
using the data described in the previous section. Because of survey time
limitations, we were forced to ask a limited set of questions and could not
ask respondents to report their earnings for all postgraduation periods.20
Since we ask students for expected earnings (conditional on school drop-
out as well as graduation) and employment probability for age 30 only,
we make some functional assumptions about how earnings evolve over
the life cycle, and in addition assume that the growth rate of earnings is
the same for all schools and graduation outcomes and that unemploy-
ment probabilities are time invariant. In particular, we assume that la-
bor earnings in year t grow exponentially at a yearly rate of gt as follows:
Yisht 5 ðYisht21Þgt21 for all schools s and h 5 fd, gg and t > 1. We can there-
fore rewrite time t earnings as a function of age 30 earnings as Yisht 5
ðYish10Þkt .21 Student i’s maximization problem in equation (5) as a function
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where v* 5 voTt51btkt and vU 5 lnðrÞvoTt51bt . Likewise, the probability of
dropping out from school s given in equation (6) can now be written as
20 Note that we do not explicitly model any of the choices during or after school (such as
the choice to take particular courses in school, howmany hours to work, or whether to pur-
sue a postgraduate degree); however, these choices should be implicitly factored into the
beliefs that are reported by the students.




l51gl . Assuming that students reach age 30 in period t 5 10 is
without loss of generality.
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Note that equations (7) and (8) implicitly assume that there is no un-
certainty in Yish10 for h 5 fd, gg; that is, the student knows with certainty
his earnings at age 30 if he enrolls in school s and either drops out or grad-
uates. We relax this assumption later in Section VI.C.3, using informa-
tion on the subjective distribution of earnings that students report. We
also assume the psychic cost is a linear function of the student’s age and
an indicator of whether parents’ income is above the sample median,
i.e.,Wi 5 l0 1 l1ðageiÞ1l2Iiðabove-median parental incomeÞ. Moreover,
since the schools considered are located in two different cities, we assume
that ls is a dummy that equals 1 if school s is in a city different from i’s loca-
tion at which he takes the survey, and zero otherwise.
Our goal is to estimate the parameter vector V 5 ffajg3j51, d, v, v*, vU ,
fljg2j50, hs, gsg, up to scale. In order to ensure strict preferences between
choices, the εis’s and y
j
is’s are assumed to have a continuous distribution.
2. Identification and Estimation
of the Preference Parameters
Under the assumption that the random terms{εis} are independent for
every individual i and choice s, and that they have a type I extreme value
distribution, the difference εis 2 εinðn ≠ sÞ is distributed logistic (e.g., Train
2009). Conditional on the student’s expectations for each school in his
choice set Si, the probability Pis that student i chooses school s in the hy-
pothetical constraint case is






  , (9)
where ~Uis is the expected utility maximized in equation (7), net of εis.
Under the assumption that the error terms {ygis} and {y
d
is} have a type I
extreme value distribution, Fy is a logistic distribution and the subjective
probability that a student drops out from school s can be written as
Pis dð Þ 5 exp fisð Þ
1 1 exp fisð Þ , (10)
where Pis(d) is the elicited subjective probability of dropout for respon-
dent i if he enrolls in school s, and fis is the expression inside Fy(⋅) in
equation (8).
(8)
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Each of the equations (9) and (10) can be estimated bymaximum like-
lihood.Equation(9) isamultinomial logistic regressionwhileequation(10)
is a fractional logit like the one developed by Papke andWooldridge (1996)
for handling proportions data. However, since the same parameters appear
in both, we estimate the equations jointly using the generalized method of
moments (GMM),where themoments are the score vectors, that is, a vector
of the first partial derivatives of the likelihood functions, one for each ele-
ment of the parameter vector. The preference parameters of interest,V, are
identified up to scale off of the variation in expectations across individuals
and schools when we consider the constrained choice.22 As outlined in Sec-
tion V, there is substantial heterogeneity in the subjective data.23
In addition, madrassas and universities have different institutional fea-
tures and it is possible that students have better information about the
school type that they are currently enrolled in. We allow for this possibil-
ity by allowing for the variance for the random terms associated with the
schools to differ depending on whether they are of a type different from
the student’s current school. We assume that VSU, SU, and IU belong to
the “university” type, while the two madrassas belong to the “madrassa”
type. Since discrete choice models are only identified up to the scale pa-
rameter (Train 2009), we normalize the variance of the random term for
own school type to 1 and estimate the variance of the random terms for
schools of the different type. In that case, equation (9) becomes
Pis 5
exp ~Uis= 1 1 q1D s ≠ i’s current school typeð Þ½ 
 
on∈Si exp ~Uin= 1 1 q1D n ≠ i’s current school typeð Þ½ 
  , (11)
where D(⋅) equals 1 if school s is of a type that is different from the stu-
dent’s current school. The parameter q1 is estimated. We expect it to be
greater than zero if students are more uncertain about outcomes for
schools that are of a type different from their current school. We include
a similar additional parameter,q2, when estimating equation (10) to allow
for differential uncertainty by school type in the decision to drop out as
well.
22 In the random utility models we use, since only differences in utility matter, only dif-
ferences in the alternative-specific constants are relevant (Train 2009). Note further that myi
does not depend on the school considered and is therefore not identified.
23 Our survey was conducted with students currently enrolled in college. This implies
that the preference parameters we estimate will only be representative of those currently
enrolled. Also, our sample is not a random sample drawn from the universe of university
students. Manski and Lerman (1977) show that with choice-based sampling, maximum-
likelihood estimators are consistent under the logit functional form assumption and if
the model includes a choice-specific constant (the inconsistency being confined to the es-
timates of these constants). The specification in (7) already includes choice-specific con-
stants, gs.
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3. Revision of Subjective Expectations
in Counterfactual Regimes
In addition to estimating the parameters of the utility function, we are in-
terestedinconductingvariouspolicyexperiments.However, in thesecoun-
terfactual regimes,beliefs aboutoutcomesother than theones thepolicies
specifically targetmay also change. Relaxation of financial constraints, for
example, bymaking schooling free—a policy we consider in SectionVII—
maymake students more or less likely to drop out or may change the like-
lihood of parents approving of a school. Moreover, the goal of such policy
experiments is to predict choices of individuals in counterfactual regimes
at an age when they are first making the choice (i.e., school-leaving age in
ourcontext) andwhenno learninghasoccurredsinceenrollment (seedis-
cussion in Sec. VI.C.2). We describe below how we adjust beliefs for the
counterfactual regimes.
Subjective probability of dropout.—We have modeled the subjective prob-
ability of dropout explicitly to be able to modify it according to the coun-
terfactual regimesweconsider suchas reduction in school fees (seeeq. [8]).
Because the psychic cost of dropout is a function of age, we can also adjust
the beliefs to school-leaving age.
Subjective probability of parental approval.—Parental approval for a given
university depends on parental preferences over school’s characteristics
(including school fees) and labor market returns, and parental expecta-
tions of those. From the student’s perspective, the subjective probability
ofparental approvaldependsonhisperceptionofhisparents’preferences
and expectations, for which we do not have enough information. We es-
timate the underlying process of expectation formation by assuming that
parental approval expectations vary systematically with the respondents’
and schools’ characteristics (including tuition fees and beliefs regarding
ideology and labormarket returns). We use student fixed effects since ob-
servable characteristics only explain a small part of the variation in beliefs.
Student i’s subjective parental approval for school s is given by
Pis a
jð Þ 5 exp kZis 1 ns 1 z ið Þ
1 1 exp kZis 1 ns 1 z ið Þ , (12)
where vs is a school fixed effect, zi is an individual fixed effect, and Zis is a
vector of individual- and school-specific characteristics. The vector Zis in-
cludes the school’s ideology, graduation rank, expected earnings condi-
tional on graduation and conditional on dropout, probability of employ-
ment conditional on graduation and conditional on dropout, school cost,
interactionof theschoolcostwithhouseholdincome,distance, school type
(a dummy for whether the school is amadrassa or not) interacted with the
student’s religiosity, and the school-type dummy interacted with religios-
ity and school cost. We estimate equation (12) as a fractional logit (similar
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to eq. [10]). We can then predict how subjective parental approval is re-
vised in counterfactual regimes.24
Other beliefs.—We assume that the expectation formation process of the
other beliefs (future earnings, subjective probability of employment, ex-
pected graduation rank, and school’s ideology) does not depend on the
parameters of the counterfactual regime we consider (such as school fees
or access to credit markets).25 When conducting the policy experiments,
we however age-adjust all the beliefs. Let boiqs denote the belief of individ-
ual i, currently enrolled in school q, for outcome o associated with school
s. We estimate linear regressions of the form
boiqs 5 v0 1 z iq 1 hs 1 v1agei 1 ϑ1 z iq  agei
 
1 ϑ2 z iq  age2i
 
1 n1 hs  agei½  1 n2 hs  age2i½  1 r z iq  hs
 
1 t1 z iq  hs  agei
 




where ziq is a fixed effect for i’s current school q, hs is a fixed effect for the
school the respondent is reporting his belief about, and agei is the respon-
dent’s age. The specification uses a quadratic in age to adjust for learning,
allowing for the effect to differ for students enrolled in different schools,
andallowing it to vary for eachof the choices.This regression is conducted
separately for beliefs about employment likelihood (conditional on grad-
uating andnot graduating), earnings (conditional on graduating andnot
graduating), graduation rank, and consistency of school’s teachings with
one’s own ideology.26
B. Model Estimates
Column 1 of table 6 presents the GMM estimates of the utility specifica-
tion. Bootstrap standard errors are presented in parentheses. Themodel
is estimated using the 1,866 respondents who have more than one school
in their constrained choice set.27
24 Because we use student fixed effects, we do not use age directly as a predictor. How-
ever, because we assume that they depend on other beliefs that are age adjusted (see be-
low), the parental approval expectations are indirectly age adjusted as well.
25 We do adjust these expectations when we consider policies that directly change them
(e.g., earnings expectations when considering a policy providing information on popula-
tion earnings). See Sec. VII.
26 Our aim is to simply roll back the beliefs to age 17 (college-starting age) in the policy
simulations, so the individual-specific residuals are retained. For example, take a respon-
dent who is 20 years old. We obtain the age-adjusted belief by subtracting ð20 2 17Þv̂11
ϑ̂1½z iqð20217Þ1 ϑ̂2½z iqð202 2172Þ1 n̂1½hsð202 17Þ1 n̂2½hsð202 2 172Þ1 t̂1½z iqhsð202 17Þ1
t̂2½z iqhsð202 2 172Þ from the reported belief.
27 Respondents who have only one school in their choice set have beliefs similar to those
of respondents in the same school having more than one school in their choice set.
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TABLE 6






Teachings aligned with ideology (a1) 2.942*** 2.674***
(.529) (.631)
Parents’ approval of choice (a2) 2.467*** 2.247***
(.326) (.238)
Graduation rank (a3) .310* .058
(.177) (.295)
Distance from current towna (d) 2.889*** 2.818***
(.105) (.112)
ln(current period consumption) (v) .039*** .046***
(.009) (.007)
Age 30 expected ln(earnings) (v*) .193*** .221**
(.049) (.096)
Unemployment probabilities (vU) 2.934** 2.753*
(.441) (.410)
g: VSU .246 .400
(.288) (.376)
g: SU 2.584* 2.313
(.333) (.457)
g: IU 2.065 .174
(.396) (.566)
g: Madrassa–City 1 .381 .541**
(.276) (.240)
h: VSU 2.862** 2.611
(.398) (.466)
h: SU 2.593** 2.535*
(.267) (.304)
h: IU 2.465** 2.436**
(.199) (.215)
h: Madrassa–City 1 2.334* 2.419***
(.188) (.146)
h: Madrassa–City 2 .000 .000
(.000) (.000)
Dropout psychological cost: Constant 21.378*** 21.44***
(.527) (.491)
Dropout psychological cost: Age .149*** .128***
(.018) (.017)
Dropout psychological cost: Above-median income 2.128 .162
(.230) (.232)
q1: School choice equation .280 .344
(.256) (.273)
q2: Dropout equation 2.333 1.799
(2.033) (2.125)
Number of students 1,866 1868
Number of observations 7,017 7032
Note.—Bootstrap standard errors in parentheses. See Sec. VI.A for model specification.
Ideology and parents’ approval are elicited on a 0–100 scale, and normalized to 0–1. Grad-
uation rank is on a 1–100 scale, where 100 is the best rank (normalized to .01–1).
a Dummy that equals 1 if the school is in a town different from the respondent’s current
location.
* Significant at the 10 percent level.
** Significant at the 5 percent level.
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.
The relative magnitudes of the first two estimates show the importance
of the school-specific outcomes in school choice. The estimates for teach-
ing aligned with ideology and parents’ approval are positive, statistically
different fromzeroat the1percent level, andof similarmagnitude, suggest-
ing that they are both equally important determinants of school choice.
The coefficient on graduation rank is also positive, but 10 times smaller
than the coefficient associated with teaching aligned with ideology. The
negative and statistically significant estimate for school location, d, sug-
gests that studentshaveadistaste for schools located inacitydifferent from
their current location.Thecoefficients forcurrentperiodconsumptionas
well as age30expected log earnings arepositive and significantly different
from zero, suggesting that earnings are also a factor in school choice. The
estimate of vU is negative, as one would expect for a replacement rate r
between 0 and 1, and precisely estimated. Assuming g 5 1:001, the esti-
mated v, v*, and vU imply a discount factor of b 5 0:85 and a low replace-
ment rate of 2.92 percent, consistent with the lack of unemployment bene-
fits in Pakistan.28 Overall, this suggests that students take into consideration
both pecuniary and nonpecuniary outcomes when deciding in which school
to enroll.
Column 1 of table 6 also shows the estimates for the psychological cost
entailed by dropping out. The positive coefficient associated with age sug-
gests that older students experience less disutility from dropping out. Esti-
mates of q1 and q2—that is, the terms that allow for differential variance of
the unobservable term for schools that are of a type different from a stu-
dent’s current school type—are positive but not significantly different from
zero. This suggests that students are not more uncertain about outcomes
for schools that are of a different type.
Table A4 presents the marginal effects of equation (12) using parental
approval as thedependent variable.Thesample is the sameas theoneused
in table 6, with an average of 3.8 observations per student. We see that a
higheralignmentof theteachingswithownideology,ahigher/bettergrad-
uation rank, higher expected earnings conditional on graduating, and a
higher probability of employment (conditional on graduating and drop-
pingout)allareassociatedwithhighersubjectiveparentalapproval.Forex-
ample, increasing the alignment of the teaching with ideology by 10 per-
centage points increases parental approval by 3.9 percentage points. The
negative estimate for school location indicates lower perceived parental
approval for schools in a city different from the student’s current location.
Parental approval for “university type” schools is perceived to be lower for
students with higher self-reported religiosity.
28 The value for g implies an average annual growth rate of 1 percent for a starting salary
of Rs. 30,000 and a resulting salary (assuming a working lifespan of 40 years) of Rs. 45,194.
This 50 percent increase in salary over the working lifetime is consistent with what is ob-
served for males’ real wages in the Pakistan Labour Force Survey for 2006–07 (Irfan 2008).
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1. Model Fit and “Out of Sample” Validation
Next, we assess the fit of the estimated model by comparing the model-
predictedchoice to the statedchoice in thedata.Column1of table7 shows
theproportionof respondents inour samplewhoranktheschool thehigh-
est in the constrained case. Columns 2 and 3 report statistics based on the
predictions fromourmodel. Column 2 reports the predicted choice, i.e., the
proportion of students choosing a school, assuming a student chooses
the school yielding the highest predicted probability. Column 3 reports
the average predicted probabilities for each school, averaged over all respon-
dents.Asonewouldexpect, themodelfits the statedchoiceswell,withonly
slight deviations. For example, 20.2 percent of the students state that IU
is their preferred school, while themodel-predicted choice (averageprob-
ability) of choosing it is 22.2 percent (20.3 percent). Table A5 shows simi-
larly goodmodel fits for various subsamples.29
Using the fact that we asked students to report their school choice
both with and without financial constraints, we next evaluate our model
fit by conducting an exercise similar in spirit to an “out of sample” valida-
tion test. In particular, we use the estimates of the preference parameters
from the GMM that rely on the constrained stated school choice and the
probability of dropout (that is, estimates in col. 1 of table 6) and the esti-
mates based on the parental approval equation (that is, estimates under-
lying themarginal effects in table A4) to predict students’ subjective prob-
abilities of dropout andparental approval for all schoolswhen school costs
are set to zero. We use these to then predict students’ school choice when
school costs are set to zero, and compare these predictions with no costs to
students’ unconstrained stated school choice. This validation test has an
“out of sample” flavor; however, rather than comparing the predictions for
a different sample, it does so for the same sample in a different state of the
world (i.e., one without school costs).30
Comparing column4of table 7with column5,we see that thepredicted
choices match well students’ unconstrained stated choices: for example,
37.4 percent (4.2 percent, 15.0 percent, and 20.0 percent) of the stu-
dents state that they would enroll in VSU (SU, IU, andM–City 1) without
school costs, while the model predicts a choice of enrollment of 29.1 per-
cent (3.2 percent, 20.4 percent, and 20.3 percent, respectively). The
weighted squared loss criterion to assess the fit of the model prediction
(i.e., o5i51wiðwi 2 piÞ2, where wi is the enrollment in school i derived from
stated choice and pi is themodel-based predicted enrollment) is also very
29 Table A5 reports the predicted probabilities but results using the predicted choices
are very similar.
30 Our test relies on the assumption that students are able to correctly predict what they
would do in the counterfactual state of no school costs. We believe this is a plausible as-
sumption since the counterfactual scenario that students are asked to consider is a well-
defined scenario that directly relates to their lives and to a decision they recently made.
2374 journal of political economy
low (0.003 for the predicted choices). Overall, we take this as strong ev-
idence in favor of the model specification and data quality.
2. Choice Elasticity
Wenext investigate what ourmodel estimates imply about the responsive-
ness of school choice to changes in self earnings. For each school, we in-
crease beliefs regarding ownearnings at age 30 (conditional onbothgrad-
uating as well as dropout) by 1 percent. Based on the assumptions in our
empirical model, any change in age 30 earnings will also impact life-cycle
earnings. To assess how much more likely students would be to choose
each school due to this increase in earnings, we compute choice elastici-
ties (i.e., the percentage increase in the predicted probability of choosing
a school given a 1 percent increase in future earnings at that school).
The mean elasticity (averaged across the five schools) is 0.117 and
changes very little dependingon the school choice.That is, while earnings
matter, they play a small role in the choice. Our result of a relatively low
response to changes in earnings is consistent with other studies of school-
ing choice (Arcidiacono 2004; Beffy et al. 2012; Wiswall and Zafar 2015).

















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Very Selective
University 13.31 15.70 12.07 37.38 29.14
Selective
University 13.09 13.53 13.57 4.20 3.21
Islamic
University 20.16 22.22 20.29 14.99 20.40
Madrassa–
City 1 24.16 20.49 24.03 20.00 20.25
Madrassa–
City 2 29.28 28.045 30.04 23.44 27.01
Weighted
squared loss .00053 .00004 .00328
Note.—Proportions and probabilities are given as percentages.
a Proportion of students who rank the school the highest in the data.
b The model-predicted proportion of students choosing each school (assigning each
student to the school with the highest predicted probability), in the constrained choice
set case.
c The model-predicted probabilities of each school (averaged across respondents), in
the constrained choice set case.
d The model-predicted proportion of students choosing each school, in the case where
all schools are in the respondent’s choice set.
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earnings elasticities of between 0.09–0.12 percentage points, depending
on the major.
We also estimate the responsiveness of school choice to changes in un-
employment risk. For each school, we increase the beliefs regarding be-
ingemployed(conditional ongraduatingaswell asdropout)by1percent.
The mean elasticity is 0.34; that is, students are on average 0.34 percent-
age points more likely to choose a school if the employment prospects as-
sociated with that school increase by 1 percentage point. The estimate
suggests that employment prospects are a relatively important factor in
school choice.
3. Willingness to Pay
We can gain insight into the magnitude of the estimated parameters by
translating the differences of utility levels into age 30 consumption c that
would make the student indifferent between giving up age 30 consump-
tion and experiencing the outcome considered. Say, we are interested in
determining the willingness to pay (WTP) to experience outcome aj with
probability P2 instead of probability P1, other things being equal. Based




1 v* ln cð Þ 5 ajP2 aj
 
1 v* ln c 1 WTPð Þ:
The WTP, as a percentage of age 30 consumption c, is then
expðfaj ½P1ðajÞ 2 P2ðajÞg=v*Þ 2 1. So, for example, increasing the chance
of gainingparents’ approval by 2percentagepoints, that is,P2 5 P1 1 :02,
would yield a WTP of .226, based on the estimates in column 1 of table 6.
That is, students are on average willing to give up 22.6 percent of their
age 30 consumption to increase the chance of gaining parents’ approval
of their school choice by 2 percentage points.
Column 1 of table 8 reports the willingness-to-pay estimates for the var-
ious outcomes. The first three cells are estimates of WTP to increase the
three school-specific outcomes, fajg3j51, by 2 percentage points. Students
are willing to give up 26.3 percent (3.2 percent) in age 30 consumption to
increase the chance of the school’s teachings being consistent with their
own ideology (graduation rank ) by 2 points. These estimates are very large
and imply that students gain significant utility from each of these nonpe-
cuniary outcomes, and that they are important drivers of school choice.
C. Robustness Checks and Methodological Results
This section reports a series of validation checks showing the robustness
of our results.
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1. Ex Post Rationalization
Since our sampling strategy is choice based and students have been study-
ing at their current school for a while, one concern may be that students’
reported beliefs are biased, say due to cognitive dissonance or ex post ra-
tionalization (Festinger 1957). This would introduce systematic nonclas-
sicalmeasurement error in beliefs, which would bias themodel estimates.
The patterns in the data, however, indicate that this bias is unlikely to be
large. For example, a nontrivial proportion (27 percent) of students rank a
school different from their current school as their most preferred choice
under their current credit constraints. Furthermore, this proportion is the
same (25 percent) among students in later years (that is, those beyond the
first year in their current institution),31 for whom ex post rationalization
concerns are arguably stronger. We also see that 41 percent of students
switch their most preferred school from the constrained to the uncon-
strained case (table 2); the corresponding proportion of students in later
years who switch is again similar (39 percent). Students seem also aware of
the different added values of the institutions, as reported by a similar rel-
ative ranking of self earnings beliefs across respondents enrolled in differ-
ent schools (the various columns in table 4). Furthermore, previous re-
search in the context of educational choices of US students has found
little evidence of students tilting their beliefs about expected outcomes
in favor of the options they had chosen (Zafar 2011a; Arcidiacono et al.
2012).
TABLE 8















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Teachings aligned with
ideology .263 .268 .225 .215 .319
Parents’ approval of choice .226 .230 .180 .184 .299
Graduation rank .032 .000 .112 .005 .112
Distance from current town 2.097 2.064 2.096 2.077 2.149
Number of students 1,866 671 1,173 1,868 2,069
Note.—The table shows the proportion of age 30 earnings the respondent is willing to
forgo for the following: a 2 percentage point increase in beliefs about teachings aligned
with ideology, a 2 percentage point increase in beliefs about parents’ approval of the
choice, a .02 point increase (on a .01–1 scale) in expected graduation rank, and a .02 point
increase (on a 0–1 scale) in distance.
31 Recall that we classify an M student as being first year if he is 20 years old or younger.
Results are robust to other classifications.
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Yet, to address this, we exploit the variation in students’ duration of en-
rollment in their school. If ex post rationalization of beliefs is a concern,
it is likely to be more serious for the group of students who have been at-
tending an institution for a longer period. We estimate the model in
which we allow all the parameters to differ depending on whether the stu-
dent is in the first year or not (that is, we include interactions of all param-
eters with a first-year dummy). We find little systematic difference in the
parameter estimates by school year (except for the parameters associated
with the psychic cost of dropout, which depend on age). Importantly, the
WTP estimates for the two subsamples, reported in columns 2 and 3 of
table 8, are very similar. This suggests that our preference estimates are
not biased due to this concern.
2. Learning
Another potential concern is that students may have had the opportunity
to learn about the institution they are currently enrolled in (Stinebrick-
ner and Stinebrickner 2014a). This learning would be problematic if we
were using the elicited beliefs to make inference using the institution the
students are currently attending as their choice. However, in our applica-
tion, we ask students about their current school preferences, and estimate
the choicemodel based on their current school preferences (not their cur-
rently enrolled institution) and current beliefs.
Still, we investigate whether there is evidence of learning. Figure A5 dis-
plays the distribution of responses for selective outcomes for the pooled
sample by age. It shows that for some binary outcomes (such as parents
approving of studying inMadrassa–City 1, or being employed conditional
on graduating from IU), beliefs of younger respondents are relatively
more likely to be in the middle of the response range (40–60, when elic-
ited on a 0–100 scale). On the other hand, beliefs about Very Selective
University’s teachings being consistent with own ideology or earnings ex-
pectations conditional on graduating from Very Selective University do
not differ systematically with age. When estimating equation (13), we find
that several of these age-interaction terms are significant. In fact, for four
of the six regressions, we reject the hypothesis that the age-interaction
terms are jointly different from zero. This is suggestive of beliefs evolving
systematically with age. When conducting the policy experiments in Sec-
tion VII, we apply these age adjustments.
3. Uncertainty in Age 30 Earnings
The empirical model assumes that the only uncertainty with regard to la-
bor market earnings is about the likelihood of finding a job, conditional
ongraduating anddroppingout.Conditional onbeing employed, students
are assumed to know their earnings with certainty. We now relax this
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assumption. Our survey elicited students’ subjective probability that their
age 30 earnings conditional on working exceed two thresholds, for the case
of both graduating from as well as dropping out of each of the schools (see
app. A for the exact wording). We fit these two data points to an individual-
specific beta distribution, and obtain the parameters of the two-parameter
beta distribution.32
Columns 1–4 of table A6 present statistics (themean,median, and stan-
darddeviation) of theaverageand the standarddeviationof thefittedbeta
distributions for each school, conditional on graduating and dropping
out. Two patterns are of note. First, the means of the expected earnings
from the fitted distribution are very similar to the average point estimates
presented in table 4. Second, students exhibit substantial uncertainty about
their future earnings, as reflected by the large standard deviations of the
beta distributions.
For our estimation, the term ln(Yish), where h 5 fg , dg in equations (7)
and (8), nowbecomesE[ln(Yish10)].33 Estimates based on theGMMestima-
tion and using E[ln(Yish10)] based on the fitted distribution instead of the
point estimates (that is, ln(Yish10)) are presented in column 2 of table 6.
With the exception of the coefficient associated with graduation rank,
which is smaller in magnitude and less precisely estimated, the estimates
are very similar to those obtained in the baseline model, suggesting that
notaccountingforearningsuncertaintydoesnotbiasourmodelestimates.
This is because, despite the uncertainty faced by respondents, E[ln(Yish10)]
based on the fitted distribution and ln(Yish10) based on the point estimates
tend to be very similar (as shown in cols. 5–8 of table A6). Column 4 of
table 8 shows that the WTP estimates based on this model are very similar
to those obtained from the baseline model (shown in col. 1).
4. Advantage of Data on Direct Measures
of Financial Constraints
Absent direct measures on respondents’ feasible choice set, researchers
typically use proxies such as family background (for example, wealth and
income) to capture financial constraints. To emphasize the advantage of
32 There are a total of 21,490 (2,149 respondents  5 school choices  {graduate, drop-
out}) distributions to fit. We are unable to fit the data points in 4,071 (18.9 percent) of the
cases; 987 cases are unfitted because the responses violate the monotonicity property of a
cumulative distribution function, while in the remaining cases, the respondent assigns the
same probability to the two thresholds. In these cases, we use the respondent’s point esti-
mate in the estimation (results are robust to dropping these observations). Overall,
18.1 percent of the students violate monotonicity at least once.
33 The beta distribution has a closed-form solution for this expectation,
EðlnðYish10ÞÞ 5 ½wðaÞ 2 wða 1 bÞðc 2 aÞ 1 a, where w is the digamma function, [a, c] is
the support of the distribution, and a and b are the parameters of the beta distribution (ob-
tained fromfitting the data points). We set a to zero and c to Rs. 200,000 for nonmadrassa stu-
dents and Rs. 100,000 for madrassa students (results are robust to other parameterizations).
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collectingdataondirectmeasures,we reestimate themodelunder the sce-
nario in which we did not have direct measures. For this purpose, we esti-
mate our GMM model but we (1) assume that all the five schools are in
the respondents’ choice set, and (2) use parents’ income as a proxy for
constraints.
More specifically, this requires interacting the school-specific constant
term, gs, in equations (1) and (2) with dummies for parents’ income ter-
ciles. This introduces eight new terms (four school dummies interacted
with the highest and middle income terciles, respectively) in the estima-
tion. Binding credit constraints in this case would manifest themselves as
students from the lower income terciles having a disutility for the more
expensive school, relative to their higher income counterparts. This is ex-
actly what we find: seven of the eight interaction terms have the correct
(positive) sign and relative magnitudes.
Column 5 of table 8 shows that the WTP for the nonpecuniary factors
implied by this model are somewhat larger than those from the baseline
model. This is not entirely surprising: including schools with higher re-
turns in the student’s choice set that are otherwise not feasible and hence
not chosen by the student would lead us to conclude a higher valuation
for the nonpecuniary factors than the estimates based on directmeasures
of the feasible choice set. This suggests that using indirect measures of
constraints may not substitute for eliciting direct measures of constraints,
and may yield biased inference.
VII. Policy Experiments
In this section, we use the estimated preference parameters to evaluate
the implications of three types of policies: one that relaxes financial con-
straints, another that disseminates information about the objective re-
turns to school types, and a final one that entails making the schools ideo-
logicallyhomogeneous.We investigatehowthesepolicies influenceschool
enrollment and welfare of the students.
We are interested in determining the impact these policies would have
on individuals when they are first making the decision of what college to
attend (conditional on pursuing higher education). This is typically at
the age of 17. Because of the possibility of learning as discussed in Sec-
tion VI.C.2, we age-adjust all the beliefs in the policy simulations as if stu-
dents were 17 years old. We first adjust beliefs about labor market out-
comes, graduation rank, and ideology as outlined in equation (13). These
adjusted beliefs are then used in the parents’ approval equation (12). Since
the psychic cost term in the dropout equation is a function of age, we
also age-adjust the probability of dropout. Finally, we accordingly adjust
the probability of dropout and parental approval for the policies we con-
sider. These adjusted beliefs, in conjunction with the model parameters,
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are then used to determine the probability of the student choosing each
school.
Our policy simulations should be viewed as providing evidence of the
short-term responses, since in the long-term beliefs may evolve in ways
not captured by our model. We also abstract away from general equilibrium
considerations in these simulations; for example, if a large number of stu-
dents switch to Western-style universities, the (subjective) labor market re-
turns to such schoolsmay change.Wedonot take such factors into account
in the policy experiments; the simulations are only designed to illustrate
the importance of each of the factors—financial constraints, information
frictions, and nonpecuniary factors—in school choice.34
Column 1 of table 9 shows the average predicted probability of choos-
ing each of the five schools in the constrained case when students are
age 17, which is our benchmark. In order to compute the possible wel-
fare gains of instituting a policy, we compute the expected lifetime util-
ity associated with the school chosen in the policy experiment (s*
p
i 5
arg maxsεSpi Eið ~UisÞ, where Spi is i’s feasible choice set under policy p) and
the school chosen in the constrained case (s*
c
i 5 arg maxsεSiEið ~UisÞ). In
panel B of the table, for the various policies, we report the percent change
in age 30 log earnings as well as the change in parents’ approval and ide-
ology that would generate a similar change in utility.35 We also show the
proportion of respondents who experience a utility gain or loss as a result
of the policy. Our simulations are made under the assumption that the
only schools available are the ones we consider in the hypothetical choice
scenarios.
A. Relaxing Financial Constraints
Columns 2–4 of table 9 report students’ choices (in panel A) and welfare
gains (in panel B) for three different policy experiments that relax credit
constraints to varying extents.
Columns 2 and 3 are based on policies in which students have the op-
tion to borrow to finance their school costs at 3 percent and repay the
loan over a 40 year period when they are working, the difference between
the two being that in column 2, students can borrow for schooling-related
expenses only after they have incurred the maximum education-related
expenses that they reported they could cover. In column 3, they can borrow
34 In the hypothetical scenarios, students are making their school decision alone but cer-
tainly take into consideration parental preferences since we find that parental approval
matters importantly in their decision (Sec. II). Therefore, this aspect of intrahousehold de-
cision making is captured to some extent in our framework.
35 For the earnings equivalent, we show only the median. Given the low earnings elastic-
ity and the sizable gains in utility from the various policies that we consider, the average
earnings equivalent is extremely large in many cases.
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TABLE 9





















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
A. Mean Probability (%) of Choosing Each Schoolf
Very Selective University 14.24 27.88 28.98 29.04 13.2 24.4 14.55 29.33 14.03
Selective University 15.43 10.4 9.43 9.49 17.57 12.95 15.61 9.66 15.07
Islamic University 18.09 20.43 19.88 19.81 18.19 19.98 18.12 19.95 14.14
Madrassa–City 1 24.48 18.27 19.52 19.49 24.06 20.15 24.41 19.35 27.53
Madrassa–City 2 27.77 23.02 22.19 22.18 26.97 22.52 27.31 21.71 29.24
B. Utility Changesg
Median earnings
equivalenth (%) 0 9.77 9.55 0 4.1 0 9.32 0
Parents’ approval
equivalenti
(percentage points) 9.10 13.08 3.74 22.07 10.83 .1 12.76 212.1
[0] [.73] [.72] [0] [.31] [0] [.70] [0]
Ideology equivalent
(percentage points) 7.64 10.97 3.14 21.73 9.08 .09 10.7 210.15
[0] [.61] [.6] [0] [.26] [0] [.59] [0]
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Proportion with
utility loss j 0 0 44.03 3.95 0 0 0 33.76
Proportion with
utility gain 18.42 60.52 55.97 0 57.07 1.62 62.53 22.75
Proportion switchk 18.42 18.98 22.95 3.95 15.12 1.62 19.15 10.52
Tax rate 5.4
Mean annual loan/
subsidy (rupees) 38,510 106,953 205,590 87,898 107,025
a Regime in which students can borrow at 3 percent to finance additional school costs (on top of the self-reported maximum that they can afford), with
repayment over 40 years.
b Regime in which students can borrow at 3 percent to finance all school costs, with repayment over 40 years.
c Regime in which schooling is free, financed out of a tax on later labor market earnings.
d Regime with an admission requirement, in which a student is “admitted” only if expected graduation rank is in the top half.
e Regime in which the ideology of each school is made homogeneous (and is set to the IU ideology).
f The model-based predicted probability of choosing each school (averaged across respondent).
g Statistics in this panel are computed by assigning the student to the school with the highest predicted probability in that regime.
h Themedian age 30 earnings change equivalent that would result in the change in utility, as a result of the change in school choice relative to the baseline case.
i The equivalent change in parents’ approval (on a 0–100 scale) that would result in the change in utility, as a result of the change in school choice relative
to the baseline case. Mean [median] reported.
j Proportion of students who experience a utility loss under the counterfactual policy, relative to the baseline.
k Proportion of students who switch to a different school under the counterfactual policy, relative to the baseline.
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for all schooling-related expenses regardless of their financial circum-
stances. Relative to the policy in column 2, this policy also allows students
to smooth consumption (between the in-college and post-college peri-
ods). Column 4 reports estimates based on a free-schooling policy funded
by income tax paid by the students over a 40 year period when they are
working and earn more than Rs. 40,000 per year.36 Notice that credit con-
straints are entirely eliminated in all three policies, and hence Spi includes
all five schools.
Apolicy thatprovidesstudent loans topartiallyfinanceschooling(col.2)
yields substantially different enrollment: enrollment at VSU almost dou-
bles, while enrollment at SU falls. Enrollment at IU rises slightly, and
falls by more than 10 percentage points at the two madrassas combined.
Panel B of table 9 shows that 18.4 percent of the respondents take out a
student loan and, as a result, experience gains in utility by now attending
a school that earlier was not in their constrained choice set. This policy,
relative to thebaseline constrained case, leads to tremendous gains inutil-
ity for the average respondent. The average ideology equivalent change is
a 7.6 point increase; given theWTP estimates in table 8, this is a large gain
in welfare. The last row of the table shows that the average loan students
take out in this case is Rs. 38,510 annually, an amount very close to the av-
erageparents’monthly incomeof IUstudents (table1).Thefull-financing
policy (col. 3), as expected, results in slightly more switching and larger
welfare gains than the policy in column 2. In fact, more than 60 percent
of the students now experience gains in welfare, some of it being due to
theability to smoothconsumption.Themedianearningsequivalentchange
is also sizable (an increase of 9.8 percent).
Note that there may be psychological aversion to taking out a loan
(Stinebrickner andStinebrickner 2008; Field 2009), especially in this con-
text, where charging interest is forbidden by Islamic law. We therefore
consider a policy that is instead relabeled as a tax on later lifetime labor
earnings of students. Column 4 of table 9 shows the impact of such a pol-
icy that provides free schooling paid out of a tax on earnings. This policy
yields enrollment changes similar to those in the student loans case (col. 3),
with 23 percent of the students choosing a school different from the con-
strained case. About 56 percent of the students experience gains in utility,
and 44 percent are nowworse off because of higher taxes on labormarket
earnings. The annual subsidy amount, as expected, is much higher: al-
most twice the size of the full-financing policy.
Thesepolicies areconductedunder theassumption that all students can
gain admissions to all schools. However, ignoring admission constraints
36 This is similar in spirit to the income-based repayment scheme in the United States
and public student loan repayment in the United Kingdom, for which students make re-
payment only if their income is above a given threshold. Results are qualitatively similar
to other choices of the threshold at which taxes are imposed.
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mayoverstate theroleoffinancial constraints. In theabsenceofdataonob-
jective measures of student ability, we use the student’s reported school-
specific expected graduation rank as a proxy for admission eligibility. As
longasstudents’beliefsaboutgraduationrankhavesomepower inpredict-
ingtheiractualrank, thisexercise is informative.Aschool isnowassumedto
be in the student’s choice set if hebelieveshewill rank in the tophalf of the
graduating class. Column 5 shows the enrollment distribution under this
policy (that is, a regime with admission and financial constraints). As ex-
pected, relative to the baseline, enrollment in the most selective school
(VSU)isnowsomewhat lower.Column6showstheimpactoftheavailability
of full financing (i.e., the policy in col. 3) combined with this admission-
eligibility requirement. The enrollment shift is only slightly lower than in
the corresponding case with no admission requirements (col. 3). Likewise
the welfare gains are only slightly lower than those in column 4. For ex-
ample, the average parental approval equivalent change is a 10.8 point in-
crease, versus a 13.1 point increase in the case with no admission restric-
tions. This suggests that ignoring admission requirements does not bias
our conclusions much.
B. Providing Earnings Information
Givena large literature that shows that studentsmaybemisinformedabout
the returns to schooling and that providing objective information about
returns may impact choices ( Jensen 2010; Wiswall and Zafar 2015), we
next investigate whether such information dissemination has an impact
in our context. If students’ self earnings beliefs are based, in part, on their
perceived population beliefs, and their population beliefs are inaccurate,
then such an intervention can have large effects. We implement this pol-
icy as follows: we assume that the median student’s population earnings
beliefs Y medianpop,sh10 (that is, beliefs about age 30 earnings of an average graduate
ordropoutof eachof the various schools, reported in table 3) is anunbiased
estimatorof the trueaveragepopulationearnings.Given the statistics in ta-
ble 3, and how similar thosemedians are to the average earnings reported
by the school administrators (col. 6), this is a reasonable assumption. We
thenpurge each student’s self beliefs of the forecast error in their self pop-
ulation beliefs, such that Y *ish10 5 Yish10ðY medianpop,sh10=Ypop,ish10Þ, h 5 fd, gg.37 The
quantity Y *ish10 ðh 5 fd, ggÞ is then individual i’s beliefs about own age 30
earnings if he had information about the true population earnings. We
use these purged earnings beliefs to update the subjective probabilities
of parental approval and probabilities of dropout accordingly, and deter-
mine the school that yields the highest expected utility for the individual.
37 We skip the derivation steps here. Interested readers are instead referred to Arcidia-
cono et al. (2012), who implement a similar policy experiment.
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Column7of table 9 reports the results based on this policy experiment.
We see that the proportion of students choosing each of the schools is
similar to that in column 1. The limited change in enrollment may be the
result of the inability of students to move due to financial constraints. We
therefore combine, in column 8, a policy in which students are provided
with both the availability of full financing (as in the policy in col. 3) and
information about returns to schooling. However, we see that both the
school enrollment and welfare gains are quite similar to those under the
full-financing policy shown in column 3.Overall, this suggests that provid-
ing information on earnings in this sample of students—a selective group
motivated enough to pursue the equivalent of a bachelor’s degree—does
not have a large impact on students’ school choices in this context.38
C. Homogenizing Schools’ Ideology
Finally, we investigate the impact of another experiment that makes the
schools more homogeneous in terms of their ideological blend. For this
simulation,wemake the ideologyofall schoolsequal to thatof IslamicUni-
versity (that is, we replace each student’s beliefs about the school’s teach-
ings being consistent with their own ideology with the student’s beliefs of
the ideology of IslamicUniversity being consistent with their own, andup-
date the subjective probabilities of parental approval and probabilities of
dropout accordingly).
In column 9, we see limited impact of this experiment on students’ en-
rollment (which continues to be similar to that in the constrained case).
However, a thirdof thestudentswouldnowbeworseoff relative to thebase-
line. This underscores the large role of nonpecuniary factors and the het-
erogeneity in demand for ideology.
VIII. Conclusion
The choice of a higher education institution plays a major role in deter-
mining the employability and earnings of university students, both in the
developed and in the developing world. This paper investigates the role
of expected monetary returns, nonpecuniary factors enjoyed at school,
and financial constraints in the choice of higher education institutions,
in thecontextofurbanPakistan.Thiscontext is relevantbecause thehigher
education system in Pakistan is similar to the rest of South Asia, a region
38 These results may at first be surprising, given that students have substantial heteroge-
neity in beliefs. However, there are two main factors driving them. First, as seen in Sec. II,
choice elasticities with respect to earnings are quite small. Second,most students accurately
perceive the relative ranking of schools in terms of earnings. Since, to a large extent, relative
earnings are important for school choice, the additional information provided by the policy
has little impact on final outcomes.
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where a quarter of the world population lives and also one that is dispro-
portionately young. As South Asian countries develop their industry and
service sectors, the role of higher education in training a skilledworkforce
is becoming critical. In this environment, we find financial constraints to
be important in determining students’ university choice, conditional on
going to university. In particular, lifting those constraints would double
enrollment at the most expensive elite university and increase lifetime
utility substantially. Nonmonetary outcomes enjoyed at school play a very
large role in students’higher education choice. For example, students are
willing to give up more than a quarter of age 30 consumption to increase
the chance of the school’s teachings being consistent with their own ide-
ology by 2 percentage points. While future earnings matter, their role in
determining university choice is only marginal.
Our results have important policy implications for the design of pro-
grams aiming at improving students’ human capital and their future la-
bor market prospects in South Asia. Relatively inexpensive policies such
as student loans or subsidies paid out of taxes (by the students)wouldhave
large positive impacts on students’ welfare. A full-financing policy in our
context leads to welfare gains for more than 60 percent of the sample. We
also find that providing information on earnings would have a limited im-
pact on enrollment andwelfare.Our results, however, shouldnot be inter-
preted as implying that there are generally few gains from information
campaigns in a setting with low higher educational enrollment. Instead
such information campaigns should be targeted to populations in which
misinformation is likely to be more prevalent, or be about nonpecuniary
outcomes. Finally, we document large and heterogeneous demand for
school-specific ideology; making schools more homogeneous along this
dimension would lead to substantial welfare losses.
There are several avenues for future research. First, our sample is re-
stricted to university students, and so we cannot conclude how participa-
tion in higher education would change based on the policies we consider.
Given the large impact of relaxing financial constraints in our sample,
availability of student loans or university tuition subsidies may also have
an impact on the extensive margin and increase overall participation in
higher education; we therefore speculate that the welfare gains are likely
to extend beyond university students. Second, our hypothetical scenarios
treat the student as the sole decision maker. In reality, such decisions are
likely to be made jointly in consultation with other people (for example,
parents and extended family members). Future work that sheds light on
this would be immensely valuable.
Finally, in today’s world, students are being confronted with radically
expanding higher education choices due to, for example, the growth of
for-profit universities in the United States and the emergence of a private
and religious sector in higher education in many developing countries.
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Our approach—of combining rich data on subjective expectations, fea-
sible choice set, and stated school choices in hypothetical scenarios—il-
lustrates the potential of using “direct” elicitation methods to identify fi-
nancially constrained individuals and to make inference on preferences
for both pecuniary and nonpecuniary factors to better understand the
determinants of human capital choices. In addition, given the dominance
of nonpecuniary and psychic factors in explaining education choices and
the inability of the literature to unpack them (Eisenhauer et al. 2015),
our approach is particularly promising.
Appendix A
A. Data Collection
Data collection was conducted by the Survey Center affiliated with Islamic Uni-
versity. To signal credibility of the study, members of the staff of the institution at
which data were being collected were also hired for the data collection. The sur-
vey sessions were conducted in groups of 50–100 students in a classroom at the
students’ institution. The rooms were large enough to ensure respondent ano-
nymity. An anonymous questionnaire was given to each participant, read out by
a member of the survey team, and projected on a computer projector. The survey
instrument was administered in Urdu at all institutions except VSU, where it was
conducted in English, since students there are more used to reading and writing
in English. The survey took about 90 minutes to complete. Students were com-
pensated Rs. 200 (USD 2.5) for completing the survey, and were additionally com-
pensated for some experiments embedded in the survey (average compensation
for which was Rs. 600). The total average compensation of Rs. 800 (USD 10) was
substantial in the context of our setting.39 Delavande and Zafar (2015) use data
from the same survey.
B. Selected Survey Questions
We present below the wording for several relevant expectations questions.
Choice set.—Students were asked about the maximum education-related ex-
penses that they and their family can cover: “What is themaximumof themonthly
expenses (including tuition, room, and board) that you and your family would be
able to pay for you to be enrolled in school without any external financial aid?”
In addition, for each of the five institutions, students were asked about per-
ceived net costs: “What do you think are themonthly expenses (including tuition,
room, and board) that you would incur on average (net of any financial help such
as scholarships, loans, and grants that you could secure) if you were enrolled in
the institutions listed below?”
39 The 2009 per capita GNI at purchasing power parity in Pakistan was $2,710, compared
to $46,730 in the United States. This means the average compensation of USD 10 corre-
sponds to 0.4 percent of the GNI per capita. The US equivalent would be approximately
USD 170.
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Schools for which the perceived net costs did not exceed the maximum ex-
penses that the student reports that he (and his family) can pay are then defined
as being in the student’s constrained choice set.
Expectations about population earnings.—“Consider a typical male student who
graduates from each of the institutions below and who is working at age 30. Think
about the kinds of jobs that will be available to him. How much do you think he
could earn per month on average at the age of 30 at these jobs?”
Expectations about own future earnings conditional on graduation.—“Consider the
hypothetical situation where you graduate from each of the institutions listed be-
low. Look ahead to when you will be 30 years old and suppose that you are work-
ing then. Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to you. How much
do you think you could earn per month on average at the age of 30 at these jobs?”
Expectations about own future earnings conditional on dropping out.—“Consider the
hypothetical situation where you are enrolled in each of the institutions listed
below, and you drop out of that institution without completing the degree. Look
ahead to when you will be 30 years old and suppose that you are working then.
Think about the kinds of jobs that will be available to you. How much do you
think you could earn per month on average at the age of 30 at these jobs?”
Uncertainty in own future earnings.—“Consider the hypothetical situation where
you graduate [drop out] from each of the institutions listed below. In the previ-
ous question, we asked you to think about your averagemonthly earnings at age 30
if you were working and if you were to graduate [drop out] from each of the insti-
tutions.However, for somepeople, itmay behard to predict howmuch they would
earn at age 30. In this question, we ask you to think about the percent chance (or
chances out 100) that your earnings at age 30 will be above certain thresholds if
you are working.What do you think is the percent chance that yourmonthly earn-
ings at age 30will be above Rs. L1, if you graduated [dropped out] from institution
X? And, what do you think is the percent chance that your monthly earnings at
age 30 will be above Rs. L2, if you graduated [dropped out] from institution X?”
L1 and L2 were the same for each of the school choices, but for meaningful
variation in responses across and within individuals, they varied across the schools
that the survey was conducted in. ForM students, L1 and L2 were set to Rs. 15,000
and Rs. 30,000, respectively. For VSU students, they were set to Rs. 25,000 and
Rs. 75,000, respectively. For SU and IU students, they were set to Rs. 20,000
and Rs. 50,000.
Probability of employment conditional on graduation.—“Consider the hypothetical
situation where you graduate from each of the institutions listed below. Look
ahead to when you will be 30 years old. What do you think is the percent chance
(or chances out of 100) that you would have a job at the age of 30?”
Beliefs about ideology.—“Consider the situation where you decided to enroll as a
student in each of the institutions listed below. What do you think is the percent
chance (or chances out of 100) that thematerials you were taught at each of these
institutions would be consistent with your own ideology and thinking?”
Beliefs about parents’ approval.—“Consider the situation where you decided to
enroll as a student in the institutions listed below. What do you think is the per-
cent chance (or chances out of 100) that your parents would approve of you study-
ing at each of them?”
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Beliefs about graduation rank.—“Consider the situation where you decided to en-
roll as a student in the institutions listed below. What do you think your rank
would be out of 100 students at each of the institutions when you graduated?
(A rank of 1 would mean that you were the top student at the institution, while
100 would mean that you were ranked last at that institution.)”
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